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INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND DOMESTIC
CRIMINAL LAW




This Article is concerned with the concept of international crime and its
relationship to domestic criminal law, particularly the domestic criminal law
of the United States. There is a good deal of talk nowadays about "inter-
national crime," but not much clarity about what the expression means.
This Article will examine the various elements that have to be taken into
account in trying to work out a clear definition of international crime, and
then will look at the range of prohibited conduct that can be regarded as
falling within that definition. In addition, the Article will examine current
United States law regarding international crimes and proposals for an inter-
national criminal code.
The Article is divided into five parts. Part I examines the definition of
"ecrime" as the term is used in domestic law; such a definition supplies the
criteria to be used in delineating the concept of international crime. Part II
applies these criteria to produce a definition of "international crime." Part
III rounds out that definition by discussing the different types of conduct
that fall within the scope of the term "international crime." Part IV examines
the extent to which criminal law in the United States currently makes
provision for the prosecution of international crimes as thus defined. Part
V concludes the Article by considering various proposals which have been
put forward for codifying the law on international crimes.'
I. THE DEFINITION OF CRIME
There are a number of different views about the definition of the concept
of "international crime." ' 2 There also is an unfortunate tendency in discus-
* Professor of Law, Associate Dean, and Director of the Comparative Criminal Law
Project, Wayne State University, Detroit.
1. The discussion responds, although not always in order, to questions posed by the
general reporters on "International Crimes and Domestic Criminal Law"-one of the topics
on the agenda of the XIVth International Congress of Penal Law. See Commentary on Question
IV, 57 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PfNAL 241 (1986).
2. It is said to be "a matter of common knowledge that there are divergent views regarding
the definition of the concept of international crime." I. BLsHCHENO & N. ZHDNov, TERROusM
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (1984).
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sions of international law to neglect the large body of knowledge that has
been developed in connection with domestic criminal la% .' Yet consideration
of divergent views on how "crime" should be defined in domestic law may
help to illuminate the problem of defining "international crime."
Generally, the concept of crime can be defined in formal or legal terms,
or in naturalistic, material terms. In a formal sense, a "crime" is an act
which the law prohibits and provides shall give rise to certain consequences.
These consequences are roughly of two types. 4 First, criminal acts trigger
certain proceedings conventionally termed "criminal," usually initiated and
controlled by the state rather than by a private individual. Second, those
proceedings involve punishment, as opposed to civil liability, as a possible
outcome.
3. See Hall, International Criminal Law from the Perspective of American Law and the
Science of Criminal Law, in I AxTuELLE PROBLEME DES INTERNATIONALEN REcHTS 82 (R. Laun
& D. Constantopoulos eds. 1957). Speaking of jurisdiction over crime, Patrick Fitzgerald
similarly has complained about the "way in which the average discussion concentrates on state
practice and its justification in terms of international law, completely overlooking the crimi-
nological aspects of the problem. . . ." Fitzgerald, The Territorial Principle in Penal Law: An
Attempted Justification, 1 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 29, 29 (1970). In discussing such topics,
he says, "we must beware of forgetting our criminology." Id. See also Wise, Prolegomenon
to the Principles of International Criminal Law, 16 N.Y. L. F. 562, 573-77 (1970); Wise, War
Crimes and Criminal Law, in STUDIES IN Com s'ATrvi CaumINAL LAW 35, 35-36 (E. Wise &
G. Mueller eds. 1975) [hereinafter Wise, War Crimes]; Wise, Terrorism and the Problems of
an International Criminal Law, 19 CONN. L. Rav. 799, 812 (1987) [hereinafter Wise, Terrorism].
Cf. W. CooKc, THE LoGIcAL AND LEOAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 9-16 (1942).
4. See P.J. FrZGERALD, CRIM.NA LAW AND PUNISHMENT 1-3 (1962); SALMOND ON JU-
PISPRUDENCE 109-14 (G. Williams l1th ed. 1957); H. PACKER, THE Lrrs OF THE CRW AL
SANcION 18, 19 (1968); Williams, The Definition of Crime, 8 CURRENT LEOAL PROBS. 107
(1955); cf. C.S. KENNY, OtrrLInEs OF CRIINAL LAW 5 (J.W.C. Turner 19th ed. 1966). Turner
stated:
[Tihe nature of crime will elude true definition, nevertheless, it is a broadly accurate
description to say that nearly every instance of crime presents all of the three
following characteristics: (I) (sic) that it is a harm, brought about by human conduct,
which the sovereign power in the State desires to prevent; (2) that among the
measures of prevention selected is the threat of punishment; (3) that legal proceedings
of a special kind are employed to decide whether the person accused did in fact
cause the harm, and is, according to law, to be held legally punishable for doing
SO.
Id.
Perkins similarly suggests that a "crime" is 1) "any social harm" 2) "defined and made
punishable by law" 3) through "a process that is primarily used for the prosecution and
disposition of persons whose conduct resulting in social harm is classed as criminal." R. PERKINS
& R. BOYCE, CRnmNAL LAW 12 (3d ed. 1982).
5. Different formal definitions are possible depending on which features of criminal
procedure and punishment are taken to be paradigmatic. Austin defined "crime" as an offense
"pursued by the Sovereign or by the subordinates of the Sovereign" as opposed to the "injured
party or his representative." J. AusnN, LECTUREs ON JURISPRUDENCE 417 (3d ed. 1869). See
also id. at 517-18. But it is not invariably the case that criminal as opposed to civil proceedings
can be prosecuted only by the state. Austin also observed that, with a crime, only the state has
power to remit the liability incurred by the wrongdoer. Id. at 518. Following up this point,
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There is some circularity in defining "crime" as an act that constitutes a
breach of the law liable to be followed by "criminal" proceedings and
"penal" consequences. 6 Yet context saves such a definition from being
completely circular. The concept of crime does not exist in a vacuum; it is
embedded in accepted distinctions between criminal and civil proceedings,
between punishment and delictual liability. These distinctions are produced
by the pattern of institutional specialization familiar in modern domestic
law. Therefore, the definition refers, beyond itself, to this institutional
background.
Nonetheless, questions have been raised about defining the concept of
crime wholly in legalistic or formal terms, as if it were devoid of specific
substantive content. Efforts to devise a "natural" or "material" definition
of "crime" are based largely on the search for some intrinsic quality, apart
from a legal label, that distinguishes criminal from non-criminal conduct.
For example, crime has been defined in terms of actions involving either
"moral culpability' 7 or some special or serious harm to "the whole com-
munity, considered as a community, in its social aggregate capacity.",
Legislators, however, have not consistently acted on any such material
criterion. Behavior which would not generally be regarded as immoral or
unusually injurious to the public at large is often made criminal, while many
moral wrongs and great social harms are not in fact treated as criminal
offenses. This is true both nationally and internationally.
Notwithstanding the apparent conflict between formal and material defi-
nitions of crime, these two different kinds of definitions in fact respond to
two distinct sets of questions. The first set of questions is concerned with
Kenny suggested that a liability to punishment which can be remitted, if at all, only by the
state is the distinguishing hallmark of crime. See C.S. KEN y, OUTuNES OF CIMNAj. LAW 530
(J.W.C. Turner 16th ed. 1952) (app. I). However, this seems to produce a circular test, since
whether permission of the state is required to terminate criminal proceedings in turn depends
on whether or not the wrong is classified as a crime. P.H. WNFIMLD, PROViNCE OF THE LAW
OF TORT 196-97 (1931). Winfield opted to fix on the element of punishment which, "once
liability to it has been decreed, is not avoidable by the act of the party offending." Id. at 198.
Williams concludes that it is a mistake to try "to define crime in terms of one item of procedure
only . . . ." Williams, supra note 4, at 128. Williams, therefore, proposes to define "crime"
generally as "an act capable of being followed by criminal proceedings," having one of the
types of outcome (punishment, etc.) known to follow these proceedings. Id. at 130.
6. Cf. C.H. ROLPH, COMMON SENSE ABOUT CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 10 (1961). See also
Herbert Packer's definition of a "crime" as "conduct that is forbidden by law and to which
certain consequences, called punishment, will apply on the occurrence of stated conditions and
following a stated process," which he takes to be equivalent to saying "crime is conduct capable
of incurring consequences formally termed criminal." H. PACKER, supra note 4, at 18, 19.
7. See P. BRErT, AN INQUIRY INTO CRIaINAL GUILT 6-36 (1963); J. HALL, GEFERAL.
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 240-46 (2d ed. 1960).
8. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5. See also C.K. ALLEN, The Nature of a Crime,
in LEoAL Dtrrms 221-52 (1931). Some acts which do not harm society, like gross indecency or
homosexuality, have been criminally sanctioned, while other acts that affect society, like breach
of contract and negligence, are left to civil law remedies. P.J. FrrZGERALD, supra note 4, at 4.
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delimiting the conduct the law actually treats as criminal and the legal
consequences of calling such conduct a "crime." The second set of questions
is concerned with identifying features common to the various kinds of
conduct that the law classifies as criminal. These common features can then
be used as a guide to determine why certain behavior is made punishable or
what types of conduct ought to be considered criminal or can be properly
excluded from the scope of the criminal law. To present the problem as one
involving a choice between a formal or material definition results in con-
flating these different two sets of questions.9 A purely formal definition is
inadequate to answer the second set of questions, 0 while the most perspi-
cacious of material definitions is inadequate to answer the first." Given their
relevance to attempts to delineate the more settled concept of domestic crime,
both kinds of definition are likewise relevant to attempts to define the less
familiar concept of international crime.
II. THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIE
In its formal aspects, the concept of crime is embedded in a web of
practices, prevalent in modern legal systems, that permit drawing fairly clear
distinctions between criminal and civil proceedings, and between criminal
and civil law.' 2 However, in other contexts, where there is not the same
pattern of institutional specialization, the formal definition can only be
applied by analogy. 3 The pattern of institutional specialization which is used
formally to define domestic crime has no counterpart in international law. "
Thus the term "crime" can be applied in an international context only by
analogy; an international crime can be, at best, an act which international
law prohibits and provides should be followed by consequences more or less
closely analogous to the proceedings and punishments that characterize the
operation of domestic criminal law.
9. P.J. FrZERALD, supra note 4, at 1.
10. See H. MA N, IM, COMPARTIVE CRIMINoLoGY 22-67 (1965).
11. For a critique of Blackstone's definition of crime, see H.F. JoLowcz, LEcTUltas ON
JURiSPRuDENcE 347-58 (1963).
12. Hence the difficulty of applying concepts like "crime" to the institutions of preliterate
societies. See J. SHmUAR, LEGALISM 83-84 (1964). "If it had been really understood how
incoherent is the reality described by such terms of Western legal discourse as 'civil law,' 'public
law,' 'crime,' 'tort,' and 'contract,' and how large a part historical accident has played in
deciding what actions and rules belong in each category, there would have been less agony
expended in squeezing primitive legal ways into these fortuitous classifications." Id. at 84. To
take something H.L.A. Hart says out of context: "It is as if we were to insist that a naked
savage must really be dressed in some invisible variety of modern dress." H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OP LAW 230 (1961).
13. In Hart's account, the whole question of whether international law is really law, is
also a question of analogy. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 12, at 226-31.
14. Cf. van Bemmelen, Reflections and Observations on International Criminal Law, in I
A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 77, 78 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973)
[hereinafter Bassiouni & Nanda].
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As indicated in the previous section, the definition of crime in domestic
law has been confused by efforts to define it exclusively in material terms.
Similar confusion is often evident in efforts to define "crime" in the
international sphere. Such confusion is compounded by disagreement as to
whether the term "international crime" should be used to refer to acts of
states or of individuals.
A. State Responsibility
It was once the fashion to speak as if any breach of international law
constituted an offense which subjected the offending state to "the penal
consequence of reproach and disgrace . . . [and] . . . the hazard of the
punishment to be inflicted in open and solemn war by the injured party.""
This loose kind of talk, which assimilates the whole system of state respon-
sibility to a form of criminal law, is obsolete. 6 Although there is an element
of distortion whenever state responsibility is represented in terms of categories
drawn from internal law, insofar as any domestic analogy is apt, the re-
sponsibility of states for acts in violation of international law generally comes
closer, and usually has been treated, at least since the middle of the nineteenth
century, as essentially similar to civil or, more precisely, delictual liability.' 7
Notwithstanding "the essential character of state responsibility as a form
of civil responsibility,"'" it has been argued that, at least for certain acts,
15. 1 J. KENT, CoMmErARs *181. Blackstone likewise had used the term "offense" as
a synonym for a violation of law and noted that "offenses against the law of nations" are
principally committed by "whole states or nations: in which case recourse can only be had to
war ... to punish such infractions. . . ." 4 W. BLAcKSTom, CO ENTARIEs *68. Cf. 1 L.
OPPENImna, INTERNATIONAL LAW 337 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955) ("Every neglect of an
International legal duty constitutes an international delinquency, and the injured State can,
subject to its obligations of pacific settlement, through reprisals or even war compel the
delinquent State to fulfil its international duties.")
16. Such talk is based on two presuppositions: 1) that reprisals or war are permissible
sanctions for breaches of international law; 2) that reprisals and war initiated in response to a
breach of international law amount to "punishment" in the sense in which that term is used
in domestic criminal law. "Most writers maintain that the sanctions which international law
provides against States as such, namely, reprisals and war, are not punishments in the sense of
criminal law." H. KELSEN, PEACE THmouon LAw 72 (1944). Kelsen himself thought it was
possible to regard sanctions such as war and reprisal as "punishment," although a "collective
punishment" different in kind from the punishment imposed on individuals by modem criminal
law. Id. at 73-75. See also id. at 101. The older doctrine, which regarded war as a permissible
form of collective punishment, was bound up with natural law theory, and it generally has
shared the fate of natural law thinking. See Munch, Criminal Responsibility of States, in 1
INTERNATIONAL CImINA. LAW: CRIMS 123 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1986) [hereinafter Bassiouni:
Ciumms]; Munch, State Responsibility in International Criminal Law, in 1 Bassiouni & Nanda,
supra note 14, at 143.
17. I. BRowNma,, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY (Part I) 22-23
(1983) [hereinafter BROWNLSE, STATE REsPoNsILITY]. It is nonetheless generally true that "broad
formulas on state responsibility are unhelpful and, when they suggest municipal analogies, a
possible source of confusion." Id. at 36. See also 1. BRoWNME, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONS LAW 433-34 (3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter BRowmz, PaRnCnLEs].
18. BRowNLIE, STATE RasPoNsIBILITY, supra note 17, at 23.
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states are or should be criminally responsible.' 9 A number of proposals put
forward since 1920 contemplate the concept of state criminal responsibility. 20
This concept has been linked with proposals to create an international
criminal court having jurisdiction over states. 2' Although in the years since
World War II, the principle of individual rather than state responsibility for
international crimes has been dominant in discussions of international crim-
inal law, the idea of state responsibility persists.22
In 1976, the International Law Commission provisionally adopted a draft
article on state responsibility which incorporates the idea of state responsi-
bility for "international crimes." According to Article 19 of the Commis-
sion's draft, "[a]n internationally wrongful act which results from the breach
by a State of an international obligation so essential for the protection of
fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is
recognized as a crime by that community as a whole, constitutes an inter-
national crime.' '23 The onus for committing such a crime rests on the state
19. Lauterpacht took the position that such responsibility on the part of states already
exists in international law: "The comprehensive notion of an international delinquency ranges
from ordinary breaches of treaty obligation, involving no more than pecuniary compensation,
to violations of International Law amdunting to a criminal act in the generally accepted meaning
of the term." 1 L. OPPismNE, supra note 15, at 339. See also id. at 355-57. Elsewhere, he
stipulates the criteria for determining whether a delinquency amounts to a criminal act in both
material and formal terms: "The essence of a criminal act, as distinguished from a contractual
or tortious wrong actionable at the instance of the injured party, is the fact that it injures, and
is punishable by, the community at large. Nor are the seriousness, the destructive uses, and the
heinousness of the act irrelevant to the question of the determination of its criminal character."
2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 192 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952).
20. Tunkin states: "Proponents of this concept fell into two categories: some adhere to
the view that only a state can be the subject of international criminal responsibility, and
individual persons can bear criminal responsibility only under national law (Bustamante, Don-
nedieu de Vabres); others believed that both a state and individuals could be subjects of criminal
responsibility under international law (Pella, Saldana, Levy)." 0. TtMxN, THEORY oF INER-
NATIONAL LAW 396 (W. Butler trans. 1974).
21. Distinguished from the idea of an international criminal court exercising jurisdiction
over individuals. For the histoty of these various proposals for an international criminal court,
see 3 INTERNATIONAL CRnaAL LAW (M. Bassiouni ed. 1987) [hereinafter 3 Bassiounil. A
comprehensive collection of pertinent documents appears in B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL CouRT: A STEP TowARD WoRD PEACE-A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
(1980).
22. See Triffterer, Jurisdiction Over States for Crimes of States, in 2 Bassiouni & Nanda,
supra note 14, at 86; Tfriffterer, Prosecution of States for Crimes of State, in 3 Bassiouni,
supra note 21, at 99.
23. Article 19(2), Draft Articles on State Responsibility, in Report of the International
Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/31/10 (1976), reprinted in [1976] 2
Y.B INT'L L. COMo'N pt. 2, U.N: Doc. A/CN.4/SER.4/Add.I (pt. 2), 73, at 75. Article 19(3)
gives examples of the kind of norms which, if breached, may result in an international crime:
those concerned (a) with maintaining international peace and security, such as the norm
prohibiting aggression; with (b) self-determination, such as the norm "prohibiting the estab-
lishment or maintenance by force of colonial domination"; (c) with human rights, such as
norms prohibiting slavery, genocide, apartheid; and (d) with the environment, such as norms
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itself. The expression "international crime" is used in the Commission's
draft to refer to acts for which the state itself is responsible. By contrast,
acts resulting in individual criminal responsibility are termed "crimes under
international law.' '24
The Commission's concept of an "international crime" has been criti-
cized.Y There are two basic objections. First, in the more usual formal sense
of the term, to call conduct a "crime" implies that it is liable to be followed
by criminal proceedings and punishment. But there are no international
criminal proceedings, or international agencies empowered to inflict punish-
ment on states. The institutions of internal law that permit a distinction to
be drawn between civil and criminal proceedings, between civil and criminal
liability, have no precise analogue in international law. Second, while the
imposition of punishment on a collectivity may not be impossible, there is
the problem of holding an entire population responsible for the acts of its
government, since any sanction must ultimately fall on all members of the
collectivity. As one commentator has stated: "When Burke declared that
you cannot indict a nation, he was uttering not a mere technical platitude
of English criminal procedure but a profound political truth. 26
In defense of the Commission's draft, it might be said that the word
"crime" is not being used in its ordinary legal sense. Normally, a breach of
international law is considered to be a matter of concern only to states whose
rights are directly infringed; no other state is entitled to object or take action
to redress the wrong. State responsibility is, in this respect, usually analogous
to liability for a tort. The Commission's use of term "international crime, ' i
"prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas." Article 19(4) characterizes
an "internationally wrongful act which is not an international crime" as "an international
delict."
24. [19761 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N pt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER4/Add.I (pt. 2), at
103-04.
25. See BROWNMIE, STATE REspoNsmLrY, supra note 17, at 32-33; Dupuy, Action publique
et crime international de I'Etat, 25 ANWAMRE FRANqAMs DE Daorr INTERNATIONAL 539 (1979);
Dupuy, Observations sur le "crime International de PEta", 84 REvUE GAtRLALE DE DRoIr
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 449 (1980); Green, Is There An International Criminal Law?, 21 ALBERTA
L. REv. 251, 260-61 (1983); Green, New Trends in International Criminal Law, II ISRAEL Y.B.
HUMAN Rjotrrs 9, 27-40 (1981); Marek, Criminalizing State Responsibility, 14 REVUE BELGE DE
DRorr INTERNATIONAL 460 (1978-79); Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?,
77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983); see also Conforti, In tema di responsabilitb degli Stati per
crimini internazionali, in 3 LE DRorr INTERNATIONAL A L'HE JRE DE SA CODIFICATION: ETUDES
EN L'HONNEUR DE ROBERTO Aoo 99 (1987); Gounelle, Quelques remarques sur la notion de
"crime international" et sur l' volution de la responsabilitb internationale de l'Etat, in MtLANGES
OFFRTS A PAUL REUTER-LE DRorr INTERNATIONALE: UNITE ET DnrERsrrE 315 (1981); Rigaux,
Le crime d'Etat: Reflexions sur l'article 19 du projet d'articles sur la responsabilit des Etats,
in 3 LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL A L'HEURE DE SA CODIFICATION: ETUDES EN L'HONNEUR DE
ROBERTO Ao 301 (1987); Sahovic, Le concept du crime international de l'Etat et le devel-
oppement du droit international, in 3 LE Daorr INTERNATIONAL A L'IEURE DE SA CODIFICA ON:
ETUDES EN L'HONNEUR DE ROBERTO AGO 363 (1987).
26. J.F. WILLIAMS, CHAPTERS ON CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LEAoUE OF
NATIONS 240 (1929).
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taken in the context of the whole draft, is meant only to suggest that there
are certain flagrant wrongs which are of concern to the entire international
community,27 and insofar as it is based on wrongs of concern to the whole
community, state responsibility may be regarded as more nearly analogous
to criminal responsibility.2 As Jessup once wrote, acceptance of a general
community interest in redressing certain violations of law would be com-
parable "to substituting for the present tort basis of international law a
basis more comparable to that of criminal law, in which the community
takes cognizance of law violations. '2 9
The idea that certain wrongs are of concern to the whole of the interna-
tional community is supported by language of the International Court of
Justice. In the Barcelona Traction Case,10 the Court stated that there are
certain "obligations of a State towards the international community as a
whole" which are by "their very nature . . . the concern of all States. In
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have
a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. ' 3" The
Commission's concept of an "international crime" coincides more or less
with the breach of such an obligation erga omnes. It is another way of
expressing the idea that certain violations of law are not merely of concern
to the immediate victim, but are regarded as a harm to the entire community.
Acceptance of a general community interest in suppressing certain wrongs
does not, however, produce a situation precisely analogous to domestic
criminal law because international law has no central authority entitled to
initiate criminal proceedings or impose punishment. Nor does international
law allow individual states to act as self-appointed representatives of the
international community in fixing responsibility or inflicting punishment."2
27. See Graefrath, Responsibility and Damages Caused: Relationship between Responsi-
bility and Damages, 185 REcuEm DES CoUas 9, 54-61 (1984-11); Graefrath, VYlkerrechtliche
Verantworlichkeit fifr internatlonale Verbrechen, 1985 PROBLEMS DES V6LKERREcWrs 89. See
also TUNKIN, supra note 20, at 415-20 ("[[In the event of more serious violations of international
law, any state, even though it has not suffered direct damage from the breach of the law, has
the right to take measures against the offending state").
28. One of the material differences between tort and crime is supposed to be that crime
involves some "special or serious injury to the community considered as a whole." P. BMTr,
supra note 7, at 36.
29. P. Jassup, A MODERN LAw OF NATIONS 12 (1948).
30. Concerning the Barcelona Traction Light & Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3 (Second Phase).
31. Id. at 32. "Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law,
from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person including protection from slavery and
racial discrimination." Id.
32. Judge Jim6nez de Ar6chaga cautions that the distinction between international crimes
and delicts:
cannot be permitted to entitle any State to take individual action when it believes
that an international crime has been committed ... [that kind of ... anarchical
system would lead to a repetition of the worst forms of intervention which occurred
[Vol. 38:923
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Indeed, the consequences of characterizing state conduct as an "international
crime" are not entirely clear.33 What is clear is that the Commission's concept
of an "international crime" is not a crime in anything like the ordinary
meaning of the term.
Moreover, even if it is recognized that the Commission's use of the term
"crime" is imprecise and metaphorical, there is the more serious objection
that its definition, largely because it lacks a formal element, ultimately
provides no precise test for determining what kind of conduct may be
regarded as falling within the special category of "international crime." In
the Commission's formulation, the concept of an "international crime"
presupposes the existence of a genuine "international community," com-
parable to the kind of community that generates national criminal law. This
simply does not correspond to the reality of international relations . 4
B. Individual Responsibility
Attempts to regard the acts of individuals as international crimes are also
complicated by the fact that there is no precise analogue in international law
to the conditions under which municipal criminal law operates. International
law lacks the necessary institutions. There is no international criminal court,
nor is there any possibility of distinctly international criminal proceedings.
In international relations in the nineteenth century. It is significant that some of
the earlier advocates of the distinction were at the same time those who defended
a policy of intervention by individual States as self-appointed policemen of the
world or of a continent. It is essential therefore that the distinction is only imple.
mented within the framework of the competent organs of the institutionalized
international community.
E. Jiminez de Arichaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECurB. DES
Counps 1, 275 (1978.1).
33. It has been suggested that the Commission's concept of an "international crime" turns
on three presuppositions: 1) that there is a special class of rules protecting fundamental interests
of the international community; 2) that every state has a right to take steps to Insist on
compliance with those rules; and 3) that sanctions other than a request for reparation may be
applicable when such rules are breached. See Cassese, Remarks on the Present Legal Regulation
of Crimes of States in 3 LE DRorr INTERNATIONAL A L'HtEURE DE SA CODIFICATION: ETuDES EN
L'HONNEUlt DE RoaETo Aoo 49 (1987). Cassese concludes that state practice supports saying
that there are certain obligations which are regarded as being of fundamental importance and
which are considered to be a "public affair," but that it is less clear with respect to the
sanctions to be imposed for breach of those obligations. A further draft article submitted to
the International Law Commission in 1985 stipulates that, besides all the other legal consequences
of an internationally wrongful act, an "international crime" should entail acting with other
states to undo its effects, in a manner to be determined by the "international community"; at
a minimum, this would involve refusing to recognize as lawful the situation created by the
crime and refusing to aid the offending state in maintaining such a situation. See State
Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/389, at 13-14, reprinted in (1985) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CO1mm'N
(pt. 1), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/Add.1 (pt. 1).
34. See Weil, supra note 25, at 426-27, 441. Cf. Wise, Terrorism, supra note 3, at 817-21
(discussing the extent to which there can be said to be a genuine "international community").
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Notwithstanding the lack of comparable institutions, there are a number
of provisions in international agreements which stipulate that the participat-
ing states must treat certain kinds of conduct as criminal in their domestic
law and take steps to prosecute or punish individuals who engage in such
conduct.15 Taken together with the implementing mechanisms supplied by
municipal law, these provisions seem sufficiently analogous to rules of
national criminal law to warrant calling the offending conduct in question
an "international crime."
The resulting definition comes fairly close to fitting the formal conception
of crime as conduct which the law prohibits and provides should be followed
by criminal proceedings and penal consequences. It is true that the relevant
international norms are not immediately directed to individuals but, rather,
are cast in the form of rules requiring states to suppress particular conduct.
Yet rules of domestic criminal law can also be represented in this way as
directions to officials about how to proceed, rather than as commands issued
to the public at large. 6 Thus, from a formal point of view, an international
crime may be defined as conduct which an international agreement specifi-
cally requires states to subject to prosecution and punishment.
This definition of international crime produces practically the same results
as Cherif Bassiouni's formula for identifying conduct that can be labeled an
international crime.37 According to Professor Bassiouni, an international
crime is conduct described in a multilateral convention dealing with any one
of twenty-two subjects.3" Further, the convention must contain at least one
of ten "penal characteristics." 9 Yet, many of these "characteristics" are
35. For the terms of those agreements to which the United States is a party, see the
appendix to this Article.
36. See Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 HAav. L. REv. 625, 625-36 (1984).
37. M.C. BAsstoum, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR
AN INTERNATIONAL Caum4AL COURT 21-65 (1987) [hereinafter BASsIOUNI, DRAFrI. For earlier
versions, see Characteristics of International Criminal Law Conventions in BSzSoum: CRnma,
supra note 16, at 1; 1 M.C. BAssioun , INTERNATIONAL CaRMES: DIOEST/INDX OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS 1815-1985, at lv-lvi (1986); Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional
International Criminal Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27 (1983).
38. The twenty-two subjects are: 1) aggression, 2) war crimes, 3) unlawful use or emplace-
ment of weapons, 4) crimes against humanity, 5) genocide, 6) racial discrimination and apartheid,
7) slavery and related crimes, 8) torture, 9) unlawful human experimentation, 10) piracy, 11)
aircraft hijacking, 12) threat and use of force against internationally protected persons, 13)
taking of civilian hostages, 14) drug offenses, 15) international traffic in obscene publications,
16) destruction or theft of national treasures, 17) environmental protection, 18) unlawful use
of the mails, 19) interference with submarine cables, 20) falsification and counterfeiting, 21)
bribery of foreign public officials, and 22) theft of nuclear materials. BAsSIoumN, DRAFT, supra
note 37, at 28-29.
39. These ten "penal characteristics" are: 1) explicit recognition of the proscribed conduct
as constituting an international crime, a crime under international law, or a crime; 2) implicit
recognition of the penal nature of the act by establishing a duty to prohibit, prevent, prosecute,
punish, or the like; 3) criminalization of the proscribed conduct; 4) a duty or right to prosecute;
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essentially different ways of expressing an obligation to prosecute and punish
offending individuals. Therefore, Bassiouni's formula more or less coincides
with the definition of an "international crime" as conduct which states are
generally required to prosecute. 40
The old concept of an "offense against the law of nations' '41 also presup-
posed an international obligation to prosecute.4 2 The definition of "inter-
5) a duty or right to punish the proscribed conduct; 6) a duty or right to extradite; 7) a duty
or right to cooperate in prosecution or punishment; 8) establishment of a basis of criminal
jurisdiction or priority in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction; 9) reference to the establishment
of an international criminal court; and 10) elimination of the defense of superior orders. Id.
at 25-26. Many of these "characteristics" represent different ways of expressing an obligation
to prosecute and punish and thus coincide with the definition of an "international crime" as
conduct which states generally are required to prosecute. See Wise, Book Review, 35 AM. J.
Comp,. L. 842, 844-45 (1987) [hereinafter Wise, Book Review). Insofar as they do not, the list
of "penal characteristics" would be over-inclusive if treated, as it sometimes is in earlier versions
of this scheme, apart from the requirement that the convention be limited to one of twenty-
two subjects. For instance, if an obligation to extradite were a sufficient condition for inter-
national criminality, any conduct extraditable under a multilateral extradition convention would
be an international crime. The qualification that the convention must also deal with one of
twenty-two subjects is said to be based on "a fairly well established consensus" about what
constitutes an international crime "which is substantially shared by many distinguished authors
who have expressed similar views over the last sixty years." BAssiouNI, DRAFT, supra note 37,
at 25. But this, in effect, produces a definition by which an "international crime" is anything
that has been agreed to be an "international crime"-usually because it is subject to an
obligation to prosecute set out in a multilateral convention.
40. Ultimately, Bassiouni does propose, without much comment, a definition by which an
"international offense is conduct internationally proscribed for which there is an international
duty for states to criminalize the said conduct, prosecute or extradite and eventually punish the
transgressor, and to cooperate internationally for the effective implementation of these purposes
and duties." BAssiouwz, DRAr, supra note 37, at 55.
41. The term "originated in the criminal law of States to designate acts of individuals
directed against foreign States and their representatives. However, it subsequently came to be
applied to other crimes in so far as conventional or customary international law binds or entitles
States to punish their authors." Schindler, Crimes Against the Law of Nations in 8 ENcYcLo-
PEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 109, 109 (1985). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, authorizes Congress
"[11 define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against
the Law of Nations." See Comment, The Offenses Clause: Congress' International Penal
Power, 8 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 279 (1969) (tracing history and development of the Offenses
Clause). See also Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (affirming convictions
for demonstrating in front of foreign embassies in violation of statute outlawing display of any
device adapted to intimidate, coerce, or harass foreign embassy or consulate in the District of
Columbia. Act of Feb. 15, 1938, ch. 29, §§ 1-2, 52 stat. 30 (codified as D.C. CODE ANN. §§
22-1115 to -11t6 (1967)).
42. In Blackstone's view, "offenses against the law of nations" (violations of safe-conducts,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy) are punished by municipal law because,
when individuals violate the rights of foreign states under international law, it is "the interest
as well as duty of the government under which they live, to animadvert upon them with a
becoming severity, that the peace of the world may be maintained," and lest it be regarded as
"an accomplice or abettor." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at *68. Cf. 2 H. GROTIuS, DE
JuRE BELLI AC PACIS 523 (F. Kelsey trans. 1925) ("A community, or its rulers, may be held
responsible for the crime of a subject if they know of it and do not prevent it when they could
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national crime" here proposed differs from the traditional concept of an
"offense against the law of nations" insofar as it requires that the obligation
to prosecute be set out in a treaty. Accordingly, conduct which customary
law obligates states to repress but which has not been made the subject of
a specific treaty obligation, while it might fall within the traditional concept,
would not count as an "international crime."143
Modern opinion generally has excluded actions not specifically prohibited
in treaty provisions from the definition of international crime. There seem
to be two main reasons for this. First, the law-making treaty has become
our primary source of international law. Second, insisting on a text comports
with the principle of legality in domestic criminal law, which requires express
statutory condemnation of an act as criminal before it can be treated as a
crime."
While it is sometimes suggested that the distinctive feature of an inter-
national crime is the universal jurisdiction of any state that happens to have
hold of the perpetrator, 4 with a few exceptions, most treaties establishing
an obligation to prosecute do not unequivocally provide for universal juris-
diction. 46 Thus, the definition of "international crime" here proposed does
not treat universality of jurisdiction47 as a necessary condition of international
criminality. It is limited to conduct which a state is bound to punish and
does not include other conduct which a state is only entitled to punish by
virtue of an international agreement. 4 In fact, this hardly makes a difference,
and should prevent it."). James Madison argued that federal jurisdiction over "offenses against
the law of nations" was needed in order to take it out of "the power of any indiscreet member
to embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations." THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 281 (J. Madison)
(J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also Wise, Note on International Standards of Criminal Law and
Administration, in INTERNATIONAL CRwAL LAW 135, 162-63 (G. Mueller & E. Wise eds. 1965)
[hereinafter Mueller & Wise].
43. On non-treaty rules requiring prosecution, see Mueller & Wise, supra note 42, at 152-
59.
44. Cf. BAssloum, DRAFT, supra note 37, at 23-24.
45. For example, international criminal law, in the absence of an international criminal
court, has been said merely to indicate "that an act is considered by the society of States as
so abominable that every State is entitled to proceed against the person committing it . .. ."
Green, International Criminal Law and the Protection of Human Rights, in CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GEORO SCHWARZENBIERGER 116, 137
(B. Cheng & E. Brown eds. 1988).
46. See Clark, Offenses of International Concern: Multilateral State Treaty Practice in the
Forty Years Since Nuremberg, 57 NoRDic J. INT'L L. 49, 51-63 (1988).
47. The principle of universality is stated as follows in the RESTATEmENT OF THE LAW
(THmR), THE FOmIGN RELATIONS LAW OP Tim UNITED STATES § 404: "A state has jurisdiction
to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations
as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide,
war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even where [no other basis of jurisdiction]
is present." See also Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 Tax. L. Rv.
785 (1988).
48. In Schwarzenberger's terms, it limits the concept to "internationally prescribed mu-
nicipal criminal law," and does not include "internationally authorized municipal criminal
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since multilateral conventions now impose an obligation to repress piracy
and most war crimes, the two leading examples of offenses as to which
customary international law is supposed to authorize the exercise of extraor-
dinary jurisdiction.49
III. TYPES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME
The concept of international crime, as formulated in the previous section,
encompasses a wide range of conduct that can be subdivided according to
various possible typologiesA0 The most generally useful scheme is one that
distinguishes between types of international crime on the basis of the degree
of official involvement in the conduct constituting the crime. Accordingly,
international crime can be roughly divided into three general heads.
The first general heading includes violations of international norms directed
toward restraining the conduct of state officials. The crimes that fall under
this head are not likely to be committed by private enterprise. Offenses
within this group may be said to constitute the classical international crimes,5
or international crimes in the narrow sense of the term. 2 The prototypical
offenses under this heading are conventional war crimes. It also includes the
law." Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, 3 CURRENT LEOAL
PROBS. 263, 266, 268 (1950), reprinted in Mueller & Wise, supra note 42, at 3, 6 & 8. Se., also
Schindler, supra note 41, at 109 (distinguishing crimes punishable under internationally pre-
scribed municipal criminal law, e.g., crimes against foreign states and crimes defined by
international conventions; and crimes punishable under internationally authorized municipal
criminal law, e.g., piracy and war crimes).
49. See Schindler, supra note 41, at 109-10. Although the "commentators agree that a war
criminal can be tried by any sovereign that has physical custody of him.., nations have rarely
shown much interest in trying crimes of which they were not the victims." J. BISHoP, JusTicE
UNDER FntE 289 (1974). See infra note 60 (discussion of piracy).
50. See, e.g., BAssiouws, DR'r, supra note 37, at 41-52 (table listing categories of crimes,
their international elements, their transnational elements and whether cooperation of states is
necessary for enforcement); Dinstein, International Criminal Law, 20 ISRAEL L. REv. 206, 230-
31 (1985) (classifying existing international offenses in terms of three possible distinctions: 1)
peacetime offenses and wartime offenses; 2) private offenses and official offenses; and 3)
offenses connected with human rights and those not connected with human rights). How the
list of international crimes is divided up depends on one's purpose in trying to devise a typology,
just as different classifications of domestic crimes are possible depending on "the consideration
which is chosen as the basis of the grouping." Allen, supra note 8, at 247.
51. Jescheck refers to the "classical domain" of international criminal law, "which was
the subject of the Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments." Jescheck, Developments, Present State
and Future Prospects of International Criminal Law, 52 REvUE INTEONAT1oNLE DE DRorr
PANAL 337, 339-40 (1981).
52. In this narrow sense, "international crimes" are more or less coextensive with "offenses
against the peace and security of mankind." The International Law Commission has been
working on and off since 1949 on a Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind. The work resumed in 1982. For the draft articles adopted so far, see McCaffrey,
The Fortieth Session of the International Law Commission, 83 Am. J. Irr'L L. 153, 154-60
(1989) [hereinafter McCaffrey, Fortieth); McCaffrey, The Thirty-Ninth Session of the Inter-
national Law Commission, 82 Am. J. INT'L L. 144, 144.47 (1988).
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two other categories of crime prosecuted at Nuremberg: crimes against peace"3
and crimes against humanity.54 By extension, this heading would also include
genocide, 5 the systematic use of torture by governments 6 and, if one likes,
apartheid.57
The second heading includes the crimes associated with terrorist activities
that have been the subject of relatively recent conventions., These activities
are often referred to nowadays as "international crimes." Unlike those that
fall under the first head, the acts in question need not be committed directly
by state officials. Nonetheless, a paramount reason for international concern
has been the generally lax attitude taken towards such offenses, sometimes
seeming to amount to complicity, on the part of states in which the offenders
have taken refuge.5 9 The old offense of piracy, which is commonly termed
an "international crime," although usually for the wrong reason, is, in some
respects, the prototypical offense under this heading. 60
53. Article 6(a) of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal defined "crimes against peace"
as the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation
of international treaties, agreements, or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for any of the foregoing." Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 STAT. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279,
288 [hereinafter, Nuremberg Charter]. This has come to represent general international law in
;he sense that there is clear agreement on the proposition that the initiation or waging of
aggressive war constitutes an offense. "What is not so clear is whether it has any practical
effect or serves any useful purpose." BisHop, supra note 49, at 282. The General Assembly's
Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (Nq. 31) at 142,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), has serious flaws. For a discussion of the development of the United
Nations definition and a critical analysis, see J. STONE, CoNmICT THaouou CONsENsus: UNITED
NATIONS APPROACHES TO AGOESSiON (1977).
54. Article 6(c) of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal defined "crimes against hu-
manity" as "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts com-
mitted against any civilian population before or during the war or persecutions on political,
racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal . . . . " Nuremberg Charter, supra note 53, 8 U.N.T.S. at 288.
55. See the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (article 1 makes genocide,
whether committed in peacetime or in wartime, a crime under international law).
56. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment,
Dec. 17, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984).
57. See the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75,
U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) [hereinafter Apartheid Convention].
58. For a list of such conventions, see Part II of the appendix to this Article.
59. Hence the focus on measures of cooperation and on eliminating bolt holes. Judge
$ofaer reaches the "painful conclusion: the law applicable to terrorism is not merely flawed,
it is perverse. The rules and declarations seemingly designed to curb terrorism have regularly
included provisions that demonstrate the absence of international agreement on the propriety
of regulating terrorist activity." Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FoR.WN AFFAIRS 901, 902
(1986).
60. In past times, governments were often ambivalent about pirates, who could be useful
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The third heading covers other acts of private individuals which have been
subjected to treaty prohibition because they involve international traffic or
harm to a mutual or common interest of states requiring international
cooperation for its effective suppression. 6' This group of offenses might be
called international crimes in the broad sense of the term. The list of conduct
considered to constitute international crime is considerably expanded when
this third head is included. If "international crime" is understood in this
broad sense, the range of the concept becomes "very extensive and difficult
to delimit. ' '6  However, if this definition of international crime seems ov-
erbroad, the same is true of the concept of crime in domestic law, with its
broad array of purely regulatory offenses.
The scheme outlined above focuses primarily on whether or not a crime
was committed under color of law. This reflects the recognition that attempts
to restrain those acting in the name of a powerful modern state are something
quite different from efforts to deal with other kinds of criminals or bands
of criminals, however violent they may be. Indeed, one of the central
problems confronting international criminal law is the problem of imposing
restraints on the conduct of those whom the modern state has cloaked with
official authority.63
There is another basis on which the first group, consisting of classical
international crimes, is sometimes distinguished from the other two groups
of international crimes. The crimes in the first group, especially conventional
war crimes, are said to involve a direct violation of international law by the
individuals who commit them. With respect to war crimes, international law
allies. The suppression of piracy usually fell to the dominant sea power, to whom it had become
a nuisance. The chief problem was to prevent other states from giving shelter or support to
pirates. This led to a rule requiring states to refrain from allowing their territory to be used as
a pirate base or haven. In Article 14 of the Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, this is generalized as an obligation to "co-
operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy .... " A second rule allowed
the exercise of jurisdiction over pirates on the high seas-an apparent exception to the principle
of freedom of the seas. Article 19 of the Convention on the High Seas restates this rule. Both
rules are said to have originated in medieval treaties. 0. SCHWARzmEEROER, THE FRONTIERS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 104-06 (1962). They gradually grew into principles of customary
international law, "in the humus of defunct treaty law." G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ORDER 35 (1971). Operationally, these are the principal rules of international law
with respect to piracy. On the early history of piracy, see Rubin, The Law of Piracy, 15 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 173 (1987).
61. See conventions listed in the Part III of the appendix to this Article.
62. Jescheck, International Crimes, 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Pun. INT'L L. 332, 335 (1985).
63. This language is adapted from a statement by Sir John Fisher Williams, which was
intended, however, to express skepticism about the feasibility of trying to subject the conduct
of states to a system constructed on analogy to domestic criminal law: "An attempt to restrain
a powerful modern state which violates the law of the great society is something quite different
from an effort to deal by measures of internal police with a criminal or band of criminals,
however violent they may be." J.F. WILIMs, AsPEcTs OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 93
(1939). See also id. 84-88; J.F. WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 232-56 (criticizing attempts to
construct "international criminal law" by use of analogies to individual criminal behavior).
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is supposed to speak directly to individuals and oblige them to refrain from
engaging in proscribed forms of conduct. In prosecuting such conduct, the
state is regarded as acting not merely to enforce its own law, but to enforce
international law. Its courts exercise, as it were, "an international jurisdic-
tion," 64 and "what is punished is the breach of international law."' 6
By contrast, the international crimes encompassed within the other two
groups do not involve duties imposed by international law directly on the
individual. Generally, the only obligation imposed by treaty is that which
requires a state to take steps under its own law to punish individuals who
engage in the conduct described. The acts falling within the latter two groups
are not directly proscribed by international law. The offender is punished
only for the breach of a provision of municipal law implementing the treaty.
This distinction between direct international proscription of the first group
of offenses, and indirect proscription with respect to other international
crimes, is controversial." Those who accept this distinction must still allow
that, even with respect to the first group of offenses, much is left to the
province and discretion of municipal courts. 67 But, in that event, it is hard
to see why a municipal court largely applying municipal law should be
regarded as anything other than a municipal court largely applying municipal
law. Absent an international criminal court, international law has to rely on
prosecution before national courts.
Yet, application of criminal law involves any number of local peculiari-
ties." National systems of criinal law vary with respect to modes of
proceeding and proof and the composition of courts that may substantially
affect the outcome of a case. National systems vary with respect to matters
64. I. BROWNLM, PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, at 561, 577.
65. Id. at 305.
66. It is asserted, to the contrary, that the sole international obligation is that which
requires states to prosecute the conduct in question; individual criminal responsibility attaches
only under national law as a result of the state's compliance with this obligation. See Baxter,
The Municipal and International Basis of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, in 2 Bassiouni &
Nanda, supra note 14, at 65. There is a more recent tendency to blur the distinction from the
opposite direction, by speaking as if not only war crimes, but all other crimes which multilateral
treaties require states to prosecute or punish, give rise to direct individual criminal responsibility
under international law, and as if it were only for want of an international criminal court that
"the world community must depend on the cooperation and voluntary compliance of states to
indirectly enforce the proscriptions of international criminal law." BAssioumt, DRAFT, supra
note 37, at 54.
67. The laws of war "leave a wide discretion to belligerent states, without giving any
precise indication as to the kind of court (e.g. whether military or civil), the forms of procedure,
or the definition of particular offenses, which they should adopt." Brierly, The Nature of War
Crimes Jurisdiction, in Tm BAsis OP OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 297, 304 (H. Lauter-
pacht & C.H. Waldock eds. 1958).
68. "Criminal trials are, of all parts of law, the most intensely national in their setting
and general conduct; they are the most intimately connected with a nation's history and its
whole habit and constitution of mind; they are the matters in which the differences between
Anglo-Saxon and continental law and practice are most profound .... " J.F. WUAMS, supra
note 26, at 252.
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such as prosecutorial discretion and prescription that may wholly cut a case
off, and with respect to how far they will go in admitting or disallowing
certain kinds of defenses and, more subtly, with respect to the whole web
of associations and appreciations having to do with assignments of blame
and the differences between culpable, justifiable and excusable actions. As
long as there is reliance on local prosecution, an international rule requiring
repression of particular conduct will necessarily be complicated, qualified,
modified, even distorted, by the system of national law through which it is
implemented.69 Thus, to say that in trying a case which international law
obliges the state to prosecute, a national court is primarily exercising "an
international jurisdiction," seems very much like putting the cart before the
horse.
IV. INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN UNITED STATES LAW
In principle, the federal government may exercise only the limited powers
enumerated in the Constitution. But one of its enumerated powers authorizes
Congress to define and punish "offenses against the law of nations.'" 0
Together with the treaty-making power, this enables Congress to create
offenses which would ordinarily be beyond its competence in order to
implement a treaty.7'
In the 1790's, the federal government was thought to have the power to
prosecute offenses under international law as common law crimes, without an
implementing statute." However, at least since the early nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court has held that the federal judiciary generally has no jurisdiction
to try common law crimes23 Accordingly, the federal government has also been
required to act on a statutory basis in prosecuting international crimes.74 Thus,
69. See Wise, War Crimes, supra note 3, at 37-42 (peculiarities and distinctive characteristics
of American law complicated the obligation of the United States to prosecute those involved
in the My Lai massacre).
70. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional power
granted Congress to proscribe international crimes.
71. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1920). The appendix to this paper contains
a listing of the provisions of multilateral conventions adhered to by the United States which
require the parties to take steps to prosecute or punish particular conduct. The appendix also
lists the federal statutes through which these treaties have been implemented.
72. See Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority and the Criminal Law, 4 LAW
& HIST. REV. 223, 225 (1986).
73. See United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1912); United
States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 415, 416 (1816); see also J. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDINO
CRnUNA. LAW 13-15 (1987) (discussion of common law crimes in the state courts).
74. However, In the case of piracy, it has long been considered sufficient for the statute
simply to prescribe a penalty for "the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations." 18
U.S.C. § 1651 (1982). See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 158-62 (1820)
(upholding incorporation by reference of piracy as defined in international law). Likewise in
the case of war crimes. The only pertinent statutes confer jurisdiction on military tribunals "to
try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal and ... adjudge
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a statute is usually required to implement a treaty obligation to prosecute and
punish given types of conduct.S
Congress has not enacted a single federal statute on international crimes.
While special statutes have been enacted to implement specific treaty obli-
gations, these have been scattered throughout the United States Code. Not
all appear within Title 18, which is designated as the United States Criminal
Code. Even within Title 18, which is arranged alphabetically, international
crimes appear in different places under various headings. The treatment of
international crimes in federal law perfectly realizes "the old-fashioned
English lawyer's idea of a satisfactory body of law . . . chaos with a full
index."76
Certain treaties require states to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over
a number of international crimes." This is notably the case with four recent
conventions on crimes associated with terrorism. The Hague s and Montreal 9
Conventions have led to revision of the definition of "the special aircraft
any punishment permitted by the law of war." Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 18, 10
U.S.C. § 818 (1982) (general courts-martial); id. at Art. 21, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1982) (military
commissions). Such incorporation by reference has been held to be permissible. See Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (trial of German nationals for espionage activities on United States
soil); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (trial of Japanese army official for atrocities committed
against civilians and prisoners of war). In practice, war crimes which involve killing or
mistreating non-combatants or prisoners of war are usually tried as common crimes, such as
murder, before courts-martial. J. BisHop, supra note 49, at 262.
75. For the suggestion that this may be an open question, see Paust, Federal Jurisdiction
Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International
Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191. 211-13, 219-20
(1983).
76. The phrase is Holland's. It is quoted by Holmes in an unsigned early review of T.E.
HOLLAND, ESSAYS UPON Ta FoRm OF THE LAW (1870), in Book Notice, 5 AM. L. REV. 114
(1870), reprinted in JUSTIC OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: His BOOK NoTicEs AND UNCOLLECTED
LETTERS AND PAPERS 41 (1936). See also M. HowE, JusTIcE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE
PRovno YEARS 63 (1963).
77. The usual basis of jurisdiction over crime is territoriality. Beccaria maintained that
"[tihe place of punishment can certainly be no other than that where the crime was committed;
for the necessity of punishing an individual for the general good, subsists there, and there
only." C. BECCARIA, AN ESSAy ON C.ums AND PuNsmdars 135 (Academic Reprints ed. 1953)
(2d Amer. ed. 1819). This used to be the position taken by the United States; the traditional
Anglo-American view did "not admit that a state may punish an alien for a breach of its
criminal law, if the act was committed outside its territory .... " J.L. BP.RIRLY, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 299 (6th ed. 1963). In recent decades, however, the United States has moved fairly
far from insisting on territoriality as the only proper basis of criminal jurisdiction; nowadays
it is often the United States that relies on what other states regard as extravagant jurisdictional
claims. See, e.g., Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. Ciau.
L. & CRiaiNOLOoY 1109 (1982).
78. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
79. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
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jurisdiction of the United States" in the Federal Aviation Act.80 The Criminal
Code defines "hostage-taking" 8' in terms that replicate the provisions of the
Hostages Convention. 2 The Code has also made punishable crimes com-
mitted by United States nationals involving nuclear materials, regardless of
where these crimes take place, 83 as required by the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Materials. 4
These four conventions, as well as those on offenses against internationally
protected persons, 8 further require a state which elects not to extradite an
offender who is present in its territory to submit the case to its own authorities
for the purpose of prosecution.86 This presupposes that the state will be able
to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in such cases. Accordingly, United
States law has been revised to establish jurisdiction with respect to aircraft
hijacking and sabotage, terrorist offenses involving nuclear materials, hos-
tage-taking, and murder, kidnapping, extortion, or assault against interna-
tionally protected persons "if the alleged offender is present within the
United States, irrespective of the place where the offense was committed or
the nationality of the victim or the alleged offender. ' 87 In addition, a section
80. 42 U.S.C. App. § 1301(38)(iii) (Supp. 11 1984).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. 11 1984). The statute defines a "hostage taker" as anyone
who seizes or detains or threatens to kill, injure or continue to detain another in order to
compel a third person or governmental organization. The United States statute imposes a
sentence of up to life in prison.
82. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, G.A. Res.
34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), 18 I.L.M. 1456.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 831(c)(2) (1982).
84. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, opened for signalure
Mar. 3, 1980, I.A.E.A. Legal Series No. 12 (1982), 18 I.L.M. 1419. Article 2 of the convention
clearly states that the Convention applies to all nuclear materials for peaceful purposes when
they are in international transport.
85. Organization of American States Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of
Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of
International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413 (Article 5 states:
"[Wlhen extradition requested for one of the crimes specified in Article 2 is not in order
because the person sought is a national of the requested state, or because of some other legal
or constitutional impediment, that state is obliged to submit the case to its competent Authorities
for prosecution . . . ."); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975,
T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (Article 7, relating to the situation where the alleged
offender will not be extradited provides thfit the State will "submit, without exception whatsoever
and without undue delay, the case to its competent authorities .... ).
86. See, e.g., Article 7 of the Hague Convention, supra note 78, which became the model
for subsequent treaties, provides: "The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged
offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obligated, without exception whatsoever
and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision
in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law
of that State." See also supra note 85 (treaties cited therein).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 112(e) (1982) (assault against foreign officials); 18 U.S.C. § 878(d) (1982)
(extortion against foreign officials); 18 U.S.C. § 1116(c) (1982) (murder or manslaughter of
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of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security & Antiterrorism Act of 19861s establishes
extraterritorial jurisdiction over homicide and physical violence against United
States nationals abroad when the Attorney General certifies that the offense
"was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a
civilian population."89
The provisions in these conventions for prosecution in lieu of extradition
are designed to ensure that offenders do not escape being brought to trial
even though their extradition is not possible. One basis on which extradition
may not be possible is the political offense exception-the rule excluding
extradition where the crime for which it is sought is considered to be a
political offense.9 The fact that a treaty requires prosecution for a particular
type of crime does not necessarily preclude its being committed under
circumstances that bring it within the political offense exception. Although
there have been various efforts to disallow the operation of the exception
with respect to certain types of particularly abhorrent crime, 9' in multilateral
treaties it has generally proved more acceptable to allow for the possibility
foreign officials); 18 U.S.C. § 1201(e) (1982) (kidnapping of foreign officials). See also 18
U.S.C. § 32(b) (Supp. If 1984) (destruction of foreign aircraft); 18 U.S.C. § 831(c)(3) (1982)
(prohibited -transactions involving nuclear materials in use, storage or transport for peaceful
purposes); 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b) (1982) (hostage-taking); 49 U.S.C. App. § 1472(n) (1982)
(unlawful seizure of aircraft "outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States").
88. Omnibus Diplomatic Security & Antiterrorism Act § 1202. 100 Stat. 853, 896-897
(1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (Supp. IV 1986)).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(e) (Supp. IV 1986). Federal jurisdiction over murder, kidnapping,
extortion, and assault against U.S. government officials abroad has existed since 1976, by virtue
of a definition of "internationally protected persons" that includes not only foreign diplomats
but also "any other representative, officer, employee, or agent of the United States government
-.. who at the time and place concerned is entitled pursuant to international law to special
protection against attack . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 11 16(a)(4) (1982). Ordinary citizens are not
included. Thus, the terrorists who hijacked the Achille Lauro in 1985 could have been prosecuted
in the United States under the 1984 statute on hostage-taking, 18 U.S.C. § 1203, but, prior to
1986, not for killing Leon Klinghoffer. See Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in
the United States: Issues of International and Domestic Law, 23 Tsx. INT'L L.. 1, 44-45
(1988). Cf. Paust, Extradition and United States Prosecution of the Achille Lauro Hostage-
Takers: Navigating the Hazards, 20 V"n. J. TwmSNAT'L L. 235 (1987) (discussing the Achille
Lauro incident and subsequent events).
90. See generally I. SHEARR, EXTRASmON IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 166-93 (1971); C. vA,
DEN WuNOAERT, Tfu PoLrrCAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION (1980). Cf. Wise, Book
Review, 30 Am. J. Comp. L. 362 (1982) (reviewing van den Wijngaert's treatment of the political
offense exception). The United States does not have a comprehensive extradition statute-only
the procedural rules set out in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195. Thus, whether or not extradition is
possible turns on the provisions of the particular treaty under which it is requested. Nearly all
of the extradition treaties concluded by the United States exclude the extradition of political
offenders. As to those that do not, it was once said that an express exception was unnecessary:
"[lt was not supposed, on either side, that guarantees were required of each other against a
thing inherently impossible, any more than, by the laws of Solon, was a punishment deemed
necessary against the crime of parricide, which was beyond the possibility of contemplation."
Letter from Secretary of State Fish to Mr. Hoffman (May 22, 1876), reprinted in 4 J.B. MooRE,
DIOEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 604, at 334 (1906).
91. "The standard formulation reads as follows: 'crime X shall not be considered as a
1989] INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 943
that the exception will be invoked, but to require any state which refuses
extradition to undertake prosecution itself.
Between particular countries, however, it may be feasible to achieve on a
bilateral basis what seems to be unacceptable on a universal or multilateral
basis. Thus, the United States government in the last decade has been
negotiating bilateral extradition treaties that circumvent the political offense
exception by imposing an obligation to extradite whenever a multilateral
treaty requires prosecution in lieu of extradition. 92 Such a provision trans-
mutes the alternative duty to extradite or prosecute imposed by the multi-
lateral agreement into an unconditional duty to extradite under the bilateral
treaty.93
V. THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
Historically, the idea of codifying international crimes has been associated
with the idea of establishing an international criminal court.9 ' However,
there is no necessary connection between the two ideas. For example, an
international criminal court could be established and its jurisdiction defined
through reference to existing treaties. 95 Conversely, a code of international
criminal law could be adopted without establishing a court, by relying instead
political offense for the purposes of extradition."' C. VAN DEN WUNOAERT, supra note 91, at
133. This "depoliticizing formula" was first used in connection with the assassination of heads
of state, and has since been used for other crimes. Id. 133-34. It appears in article 7 of the
Genocide Convention, supra note 55, and in article 11 of the Apartheid Convention, supra
note 57. It appears in article I of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism,
opened for signature Jan. 27 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90, 15 I.L.M. 1272, but not in conventions
dealing with particular aspects of terrorism concluded by the wider "international community"-
precisely because these offenses, for "lack of political agreement, could not be 'depoliticized."'
C. VAN DEN W NGAERT, supra note 91, at 149.
92. Such treaties provide that "crimes that would otherwise be non-extraditable as political
offenses are extraditable if a party to the treaty has an obligation to prosecute or extradite
because of multilateral international agreements." Report of the Committee on International
Terrorism, in AmtaR. BRAN cH, INT'L L. Ass'N 1985-86 PROCEEDINOS AND COMMITTEE REPORTs
126, 129.
93. See Bassiouni, The "Political Offense Exception" Revisited: Extradition Between the
U.S. and the U.K.-A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation Among Allies and Sound Law
and Policy, 15 DENVER J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 255, 267 (1987). The controversial Supplementary
Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom contains such a clause, but goes further and also
eliminates the political offense exception with respect to violent crimes such as murder, maiming,
kidnapping, and use of bombs, even when these offenses do not constitute "international
crimes." See Supplementary Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, United States-United Kingdom,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 8, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985), amended by S. ExEc. REP. No. 17,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, app. 1 at 15 (1986), reprinted in 132 CoNG. REc. 59120 (daily ed. July
16, 1986). The final version is also reproduced in the appendix to Lubet, Extradition Unbound.
A Reply to Professors Blakesley and Bassiouni, 24 TEx. INT'L L.J. 47, 62 (1989).
94. This paragraph is largely borrowed from Wise, Codification: Perspectives and Ap-
proaches, in 1 BAssioum: CRnwEs, supra note 16, at 101, 107.
95. This has been proposed by the International Criminal Law Committee of the Inter-
national Law Association. See 1978 REP. INT'L L. A. 473, 475-76; 1980 REP. INT'L L. A. 400,
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on "indirect enforcement"6 through interstate cooperation and municipal
prosecution,97 as in the present system, or on some international mechanism,
short of a court, for focusing public outrage on those to whom prima facie
violations can be attributed.98
There have been a number of recent efforts to codify international crimes.
One such effort is the International Law Commission's Draft Code of
Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which is limited to
"international crime" in the narrow sense." Other proposals are broader in
scope.' ® Nonetheless, there seems to be little point to adopting a substantive
401-02; 1982 REP. INT'L L. A. 377, 454-62 (draft statute establishing an International Criminal
Court with provisions for jurisdiction, organization, procedures and judicial qualifications);
1984 REP. INT'L L. A. 252, 292-99 (redraft of the 1982 statute). On the other hand, the
Committee has more recently proposed to add protocols that would delineate sanctions and
defenses-matters usually included in the general part of a national criminal code. See 1984
REP,. INT'L L. A. 252, 292-99 (proposing sanctions for violations of 'arious treaty provisions
and a statute of limitations); 1986 REP. INT'L L. A. 357, 366-76 (setting out defenses for
violations of various treaty provisions). The cross-referencing technique is also used in the Draft
Convention on International Crimes proposed by the Foundation for the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court. See R. WOETZEL, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CRmINAL COURT: A REPORT ON THE FIRST & SECOND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONFER-
ENCES 14-15 (1973). Cf. TOWARD A FEASBLE INTERNATIONAL CRDANAL COURT (. Stone & R.
Woetzel eds. 1970) (discussing draft statutes concerning an international criminal court and
methods of establishing jurisdiction).
96. BA soum, DRAFT CODE, infra note 100, at 37, distinguishes between the use of "a
comprehensive code by an International Criminal Court (Direct Enforcement Model)," and its
enforcement through a "national criminal justice system (Indirect Enforcement Model)." See
also BAssioum, DRAFT, supra note 37, at 69 (discussing the "Direct Enforcement Model" and
the "Indirect Enforcement Model").
97. The latest version of the International Law Commission's Draft Code, see supra note
52, contemplates enforcement through national courts, although it "preserves the possibility
that an international court may be established." McCaffrey, Fortieth, supra note 52, at 157.
"The Commission has twice asked the General Assembly whether its mandate to prepare the
code includes the drafting of a statute of an international criminal court, but has to date
received no definitive response." Id. at 157 n.5.
98. See Mueller, Two Enforcement Models for International Criminal Justice, in EToDEs
EN L'HONNEUR DE JEAN GRAVEN 107 (1969). See also Friedlander, Enforcement Models of
International Criminal Law, NEW HOIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL CRDAl.A LAW 85 (Association
Internationale de Droit Pnal Nouvelles Etudes Pdnales No. 6, 1985) (discussing an expanded
range of enforcement models and their probable effectiveness, sketched in a presentation by
Gerhard Mueller). Cf. Mueller & Besharov, The Existence of International Criminal Law and
its Evolution to the Point of its Enforcement Crisis, in 1 Bassioui & Nanda, supra note 14, at
5; Mueller & Besharov, Evolution and Enforcement of International Criminal Law, in I
BAssbouNt: Ciwnas, supra note 16, at 59 (Mueller's enforcement models and their development
in international law).
99. See supra note 52 and accompanying text on the International Law Commission's
draft.
100. Bassiouni's draft encompasses all international crimes, in the broadest possible sense
of the term. See generally BAsslouNi, DRAFT, supra note 37; M.C. BAssIouNi, INTERNATIONAL
CRaIINAL LAW: A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRnMINAL CODE (1980) [hereinafter BAssIoUNi, DR'r
CODE]. Cf. Le Projet de Code Pknal International: Commentaires, 52 REvUE INTERNATIONALE
DE DRoIr PANAL 327-527 (1981) (symposium on 1980 version of the draft code).
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code of international crimes unless some kind of enforcement system can be
established. The main obstacles to effective enforcement derive from political
disagreement, and the nature and depth of such disagreement varies with
the different types of conduct that can be characterized as an international
crime. For this reason, it may indeed be inadvisable to lump all international
crimes together in a single code. 10'
Underlying proposals for more comprehensive codification is the image of
a genuine "international community," acting, although often imperfectly,
to prohibit and punish conduct that results in harm to its commonly shared
values. '°" This "international community" is depicted as identifying conduct
harmful to the "common good" and as labelling such conduct as "criminal."
The object of comprehensive codification is to systematize a set of rules
which are regarded as materially analogous to those of domestic criminal
law and thereby to improve the procedures by which the whole community,
through its constituted representatives, inflicts punishment on those who
violate rules promulgated for the protection of its fundamental interests.
The difficulty with this picture is that, at present, a genuine international
community does not exist. 03 International relations can be adequately de-
scribed, at any given time, only in terms of elements drawn from each of
three competing paradigms. In some respects, there does seem to be an
incipient global community. In other respects, states seem to exist in a
Hobbesian state of nature, a moral and legal vacuum, in which anything
resembling a system of domestic criminal law is clearly impossible.1 4 In yet
other respects, they form a "society of states," in which each member
101. The International Law Commission's work on a Draft Code of Offenses Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind indeed presupposes that the classical international crimes require
separate treatment. Sec. 1201 of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security & Antiterrorism Act of 1986,
supra note 88, expresses "the sense of the Congress that the President should establish a process
to encourage the negotiation of an international convention to prevent and control all aspects
of international terrorism" and that "the President should also consider including on the agenda
for these negotiations the possibility of eventually establishing an international tribunal for
prosecuting terrorists." One is reminded of the abortive effort, under the League of Nations,
to set up an international criminal court to try cases of terrorism. See Convention for the
Creation of an International Criminal Court, Nov. 16, 1937, reprinted in 7 INrENATIONAL
LEOtSLATION 878 (M. Hudson ed. 1941). At any rate, both proposals contemplate an international
tribunal limited to trying a particular type of international crime. It may be significant that
these more or less "official" proposals limit the prospective jurisdiction of an international
criminal court; it is the "unofficial" drafts that suggest general jurisdiction over the whole
range of international offenses.
102. See Wise, Book Review, supra note 39, at 846.
103. The international community "is an order in posse in the minds of men; in the realities
of the international scene it is still groping towards existence; it does not represent an actually
established order." De Visscher, Positivisme et "jus cogens," 75 REvuE GtutRALE DE Daorr
INTERNATIONAL PUBLiC 5, 8 (1971), quoted in Well, supra note 25, at 441. See also C. DE
VISSCHER, THEoRY AND R..ALrry IN Ptmuc INTERNATIONAL LAW 89-101 (P. Corbett trans. rev.
ed. 1968).
104. "Where no civil society is, there is no crime." T. HoBnBS, LEavUHM 190 (M. Oakeshott
ed. 1957) (1651 ed.).
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pursues its own purposes rather than some international "common good,"
but is constrained by rules regarding toleration and accommodation that
make it possible for the society to continue to exist.
None of these three paradigms is completely valid; only their complemen-
tary adequacies and inadequacies supply anything like a full truth about the
realities of international relations. 10 Yet, despite these descriptive difficulties,
a surrender to incommensurate complexity is also unsatisfactory. The real
problem is to forge a response using the qualifications and involutions
suggested by all three of these strongly contrasting paradigms to determine
the most apt way of representing the actual social reaction to each particular
class of international crime.
CONCLUSION
The first step, then, toward understanding international crime is to clarify
our ideas about what is meant by "crime" as the term is used in its ordinary
domestic context. The concept of crime can be projected into the international
sphere only by analogy. Provisions of multilateral treaties requiring states
to prosecute and punish particular forms of individual conduct do furnish
a sufficiently close analogy to the prohibitions of domestic criminal law and,
at least in a formal sense, can therefore be regarded as creating international
crimes. Nonetheless, the conditions under which international criminal law
operates are materially different from those obtaining in domestic commu-
nities. It is fatuous to ignore these differences-to treat the problems involved
in developing a law of international crime as essentially similar to those
involved in codifying domestic criminal law. The study of international
criminal law poses fascinating questions about the feasibility of using the
concept of crime outside the national contexts in which it originates, about
the connection between communal cohesion and criminal law, and about the
degree of cohesiveness that actually exists in the international system. It begs
the answer to these questions to presuppose that international crimes are the
creation of a genuine international community. The reality is far more
complicated.
105. Wise, Book Review, supra note 39, at 846-47. See also Wise, Terrorism, supra note




Provisions of United States Law Implementing International
Obligations to Prosecute under Multilateral Conventions
I. WAR CRIMuS & GENOCE
A. Conventional War Crimes
I. Law of The Hague
Article I of Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, The Hague, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539,
1 Bevans 631, provides: "The Contracting Powers shall issue instructions to
their armed land forces which shall be in conformity with the Regulations
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the present
Convention." Article 3 provides: "A belligerent party which violates the
provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to
pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons
forming part of its armed forces." (There is no equivalent to Article 3 in
the earlier Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, The Hague, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403, 1 Bevans
247.) Convention IV may be said to contemplate that soliders who deviate
from Instructions requiring compliance with the Hague Regulations will be
subjected to punishment under municipal military law. It does not, however,
formally impose an obligation to prosecute.
Compare Article 28 of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, May 14, 1954, 249
U.N.T.S. 240: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to take, within the
framework of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps to
prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions upon those persons, of
whatever nationality, who commit or order to be committed a breach of the
present Convention." The United States signed but has not ratified the 1954
Hague Convention on Cultural Property.
Violations of the Hague Regulations, as well as other conventional war
crimes, are punishable in United States law by virtue of the provisions of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice which confer jurisdiction on military
tribunals to try "any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a
military tribunal. . . ." (10 U.S.C. § 818; 10 U.S.C. § 821).
2. Prohibited Weapons
Article 4 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weap-
ons and on their Destruction, Washington, London & Moscow, April 10,
1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062, provides:
"Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its consti-
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tutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents,
toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of
this Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or
under its control anywhere."
Article 4 of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, Geneva, May 18,
1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. 9614, provides: "Each State Party to this
Convention undertakes to take any measures it considers necessary in ac-
cordance with its constitutional processes to prohibit and prevent any activity
in violation of the provisions of the Convention anywhere under its juris-
diction or control."
Neither formally imposes an obligation to prosecute. Nor does the Protocol
for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, June 17, 1925,
94 L.N.S.T. 65, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061; all the Geneva Protocol
provides is that "the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already
Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition" and "agree
to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare."
3. Law of Geneva
There are common provisions concerning "repression of abuses and in-
fractions" in each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949: the Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Geneva, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 6 U.S.T.
3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Geneva, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No.
3363; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva,
August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; and
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Geneva, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No.
3365.
Under these provisions the parties are obligated (1) "to enact any legislation
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or
ordering to committed" what are called "grave breaches" of the Conven-
tion-violations involving "wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment,
including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly"; (2) "to seach for persons alleged to have committed, or to have
ordered to be committed, such grave breaches" and to "bring such persons,
regardless of nationality, before its own courts" or to "hand such persons
over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned"; and (3) to
"take measures necessary for the suppression" of violations of the Conven-
tion that do not amount to "grave breaches." Further obligations with
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respect to "repression of breaches of the conventions" are contained in the
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions, Geneva, June 8, 1977; the
United States has not ratified either of these two Protocols.
As with the Hague Conventions, violations of the Geneva Conventions
are punishable in United States law by military courts exercising the juris-
diction over violations of the laws of war conferred by the Uniform Code
of Military Justice.
B. Violations of Neutrality
Article 5 of Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, The Hague, October
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540, 1 Bevans 654, provides that a neutral
power "is not called upon to punish acts in violation of its neutrality unless
the said acts have been committed on its own territory." This may be taken
to imply that it is called upon to punish acts violative of neutrality which
are committed on its own territory, although all that the terms of the
Convention actually provide is that it "must not allow" such acts to occur
on its territory.
Article 8 Hague Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers in Naval War, The Hague, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415,
T.S. No. 545, 1 Bevans 723, requires a neutral Government "to employ the
means at its disposal to prevent" violations of neutrality from occurring
within its jurisdiction.
Article 26 of the Convention on Maritime Neutrality, Havana, February
20, 1928, 135 L.N.T.S. 187, 47 Stat. 1989, T.S. 845, 2 Bevans 721, similarly
provides: "Neutral states are bound to exert all the vigilance within their
power in order to prevent" violations of neutrality from occurring in their
ports or territorial waters. Article 27 provides: "A belligerent shall indemnify
the damage caused by its violation" of the provisions of the Convention,
and "shall likewise be responsible for the acts of persons who may belong
to its armed forces."
Neither of the conventions on maritime neutrality formally imposes an
obligation to prosecute. Nonetheless, violations of neutrality are among the
oldest crimes in United States law. Most of the relevant provisions are
contained in 18 U.S.C. §§ 956-967. Under these statutes, conspiracy to injure
property of a foreign government with which the United States is at peace
is punishable by three years imprisonment and a fine of $5,000 (18 U.S.C.
§ 956); possession of property intended for use in aiding another government
to violate "the rights or obligations of the United States under any treaty
or the law of nations," by ten years imprisonment and a fine of $1,000 (18
U.S.C. § 957); accepting a commission to serve against a friendly nation,
by three years imprisonment and a fine of $2,000; enlisting in foreign service,
by three years imprisonment and a fine of $1,000 (18 U.S.C. § 959); launching
a military or naval expedition against a friendly nation, by three years
imprisonment and a fine of $3,000 (18 U.S.C. § 960); augmenting the
armament of a warship in violation of United States neutrality, by a years
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imprisonment and a fine of $1,000 (18 U.S.C. § 961); arming a vessel in
violation of United States neutrality, by three years imprisonment and a fine
of $10,000 (18 U.S.C. § 962); taking such a vessel out of port, in violation
of an order detaining it in the United States, by ten years imprisonment and
a fine of $10,000 (18 U.S.C. § 963); delivering an armed vessel to a belligerent
nation in violation of United States neutrality, by ten years imprisonment
and a fine of $10,000 (18 U.S.C. § 964); taking a vessel out of port without
the clearance required to ensure United States neutrality, by ten years
imprisonment and a fine of $10,000 (18 U.S.C. §§ 965-966); taking out of
port a vessel which has been forbidden to depart because "there is reasonable
cause to believe that such vessel is about to carry fuel, arms, ammunition,
men, supplies, dispatches, or information to any warship, tender, or supply
ship of a foreign belligerant nation in violation of the laws, treaties, or
obligations of the United States under the law of nations," by ten years
imprisonment and a fine of $10,000 (18 U.S.C. § 967).
Further provisions with respect to neutrality are contained in 22 U.S.C.
§§ 441-465. These prescribe the consequences of a formal proclamation of
neutrality. Violations are generally punishable by two years imprisonment
and fine of $10,000 (22 U.S.C. § 455); trading in government bonds of a
state named in the proclamation, by five years imprisonment and a fine of
$50,000 (22 U.S.C. § 447).
C. Genocide
In the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, New York, December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, the parties
"confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of
war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and
punish" (Article I), and "undertake to enact, in accordance with their
respective Constitutions, the tiecessary legislation to give effect to the pro-
visions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective
penalties for persons guilty of genocide" or of conspiracy, incitement,
attempt, and complicity in genocide (Article V).
The United States Senate finally approved ratification of the Genocide
Convention on February 19, 1986. The Convention is now implemented in
United States law by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093, which were added by the
Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-606, 102
Stat. 3045, enacted on November 5, 1988. Under this Act, forms of genocide
which involve actual killing are punishable by life imprisonment and a fine
of $1,000,000; other forms of genocide, by twenty years imprisonment and
a fine of $1,000,000; incitement by five years imprisonment and a fine of
$500,000 (18 U.S.C. § 1091).
II. PIRAcY, HuAcKiNG AND TEiRomsm
A. Piracy
Article 14 of the Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, April 29, 1958,
450 U.N.T.S. 82, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, provides: "All States
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shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on
the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State."
18 U.S.C. § 1651 provides: "Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime
of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into
or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life." (18 U.S.C. §§
1652-1661 define various statutory forms of piracy, privateering, and related
offenses; 33 U.S.C. §§ 381-387 contain regulations for the suppression of
piracy.)
B. Hijacking and Sabotage
Article 3(b) of the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Com-
mitted on Board Aircraft, Tokyo, September 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219,
20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, provides: "Each contracting State shall
take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction as the
State of registration over offenses committed on board aircraft registered in
such State."
On the other hand, Article 1(2) of the Tokyo Convention says that "this
Convention shall apply in respect of offences committed or acts done by a
person on board any aircraft registered in a Contracting State, while that
aircraft is in flight or on the surface of the high seas or of any other area
outside the territory of any State." It is unclear how far this provision
qualifies the obligation to establish jurisdiction in the state of registration,
limiting it to cases in which no other state has territorial jurisdiction.
In 18 U.S.C. § 7(5), the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States" is defined to include a United States owned aircraft in
flight over the high seas or "other waters within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular
State." This assimilates an aircraft flying over the high seas to a United
States ship for purposes of establishing federal jurisdiction ("the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" also extends to
the surface of the high seas and, under 18 U.S.C. § 7(7), to any "place
outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by or against
a national of the United States.")
Further, in the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. App. § 1301(38), the
"special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States" is defined to include,
inter alia, any aircraft registered in the United States. Certain crimes com-
mitted on an aircraft registered in the United States (and thus "within the
special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States") are punishable under 49
U.S.C. App. § 1472(k): offenses involving assault, mayhem, theft, homicide,
rape, and robbery, are to be punished as if committed on board a United
States ship ("within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States"); indecent exposure, as if committed in the District of Co-
lumbia, in violation of D.C. Code 22-1112. Certain other crimes involving
hazards to the safety of aviation are separately punishable under federal
law. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 31-35; 49 U.S.C. App. § 1472. But there is no
general federal jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a United States
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registered aircraft in flight over the territory of a particular state.
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, The
Hague, December 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S.
No. 7192, stipulates that the unlawful seizure of an aircraft in flight by
anyone on board is an offense, as is attempt and complicity (Article 1).
"Each Contracting State undertakes to make the offence punishable by
severe penalties (Article 2), to "establish its jurisdiction over the offence"
in accordance with the rules set out in Article 5, and to treat the offence as
extraditable (Article 8). "The Contracting State in the territory of which the
alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged,
without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed
In its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose
of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner
as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of
that State." (Article 7).
Under 42 U.S.C. App. § 1472(i), "aircraft piracy" is punishable by a
minimum of twenty years imprisonment; if death results, by life imprison-
ment or death. The seizure of an aircraft comes within this provision only
if the aircraft was "within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United
States." In 42 U.S.C. App. § 1301, the "special aircraft jurisdiction of the
United States" is defined to include not only United States registered aircraft
and aircraft within the United States, but also a foreign aircraft making its
next scheduled landing in the United States or landing in the United States
with an offender who has committed the "offense" defined in the Hague
Convention on board. Further, under 42 U.S.C. App. § 1472(n), the "of-
fense" defined in the Hague Convention is similarly punishable, even though
the aircraft was "outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United
States," if the offender "is afterward found in the United States."
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Civil Aviation, Montreal, September 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, 24
U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, provides that intentional and unlawful acts
endangering the safety of an aircraft, as well as attempts and complicity,
are an offense (Article 1). The parties undertake to make these offenses
"punishable by severe penalties" (Article 2), to establish their jurisdiction
in accordance with the rules set out in Article 5, to treat such offenses as
extraditable (Article 8) and, if extradition is not granted, to submit the case
to the competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution (Article 7). (The
Montreal Convention is supplemented by the Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving Civil Aviation, Montreal,
February 24, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 627 (1988).)
The Montreal Convention is implemented by provisions contained in 18
U.S.C. §§ 31-32, as amended by the Aircraft Sabotage Act, enacted as part
of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat.
2187. The various forms of aircraft sabotage described in the Montreal
Convention are punishable by a fine of $100,000 and twenty years impris-
onment; threats are punishable by a fine of $25,000 and five years impris-
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onment (18 U.S.C. § 32). If death results, the offense is punishable by death
or imprisonment for life (18 U.S.C. § 34). Under 18 U.S.C. § 32(a), these
punishments apply to all offenses under the Montreal Convention committed
with respect to an "aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United
States or any civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas,
or foreign air commerce." Under 49 U.S.C. App. § 1301(38)(d)(iii), the
"special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States" is extended to include a
foreign aircraft landing in the United States with an offender who has
committed certain of the offenses defined in the Montreal Convention (de-
struction of air navigation facilties and conveying false information) still on
board. The other offenses defined in the Montreal Convention (in-flight
violence, damaging aircraft, and placing of explosive devises) are made
punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 32(b) when committed with respect to a civil
aircraft registered in a foreign country "if the offender is later found in the
United States."
C. Hostages
The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, New York,
December 17, 1979, U.N. G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979), defines
offenses involving "hostage-taking" (Article 1), and requires the parties to
make such offenses "punishable by appropriate penalties which take into
account the grave nature of those offences" (Article 2). It also requires the
parties to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with the rules set out in
Article 5, to treat these offenses as extraditable (Article 10) unless there are
substantial grounds for believing that the offender will be persecuted "on
account of his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion"
(Article 9) and, if extradition is not granted, to submit the case to the
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution (Article 8).
The Hostages Convention is implemented in the United States by the Act
for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking, 18
U.S.C. § 1203, enacted as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984. Under this act, hostage-taking is punishable by "imprisonment for any
term of years or for life." 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a). The act applies to offenses
committed outside the United States whenever the offender is found in the
United States. It also purports to apply, even if the offender is not found
in the United States, when the offender or the hostage was a United States
national or threats were aimed at the United States government. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1203(b)(1).
D. Internationally Protected Persons
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Vienna, April 18, 1961,
500 U.N.T.S. 95, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, provides that a
"receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to
protect" diplomatic premises "against any intrusion or damage and to
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prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its
dignity" (Article 22(2)), and to treat a diplomatic agent "with due respect"
and "take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom
or dignity" (Article 29). In the Convention itself, appropriate preventive
steps are not specifically defined to include the threat of criminal prosecution
for attacks on diplomats or diplomatic premises.
Under the OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism
Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are
of International Significance, Washington, February 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949,
T.I.A.S. No. 8413, the parties agree to cooperate by "taking all the measures
that they may consider effective ... to prevent and punish acts of terrorism,
especially kidnapping, murder and other assaults against the life or physical
integrity of those persons to whom the state has the duty according to
international law to give special protection, as well as extortion in connection
with those crimes" (Article 1). Such offenses are to be treated as extraditable
(Articles 3 & 7) and to be "considered common crimes of international
significance, regardless of motive" (Article 2). A state which declines to
extradite because of a legal or constitutional impediment, "is obliged to
submit the case to its competent authroties for prosecution, as if the act had
been committed in its territory" (Article 5).
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, New York,
December 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532,
requires each party to make "a crime under its internal law ... punishable
by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature" any
intentionally committed (a) "murder, kidnapping or other attack on the
person or liberty of an internationally protected person" or (b) "violent
attack upon the official premises, the private accommodation or the means
of transport of an internationally protected person likely to endanger his
person or liberty," or (c) "threat to commit any such attack," or (d)
"attempt to commit any such attack," or (e) complicity therein (Article 2).
The parties are required to take such measures as may be necessary to
establish their jurisdiction over these crimes in accordance with the rules set
out in Article 3, to treat these offenses as extraditable (Article 8) and, if
extradition is not granted, to submit the case to the competent authorities
for the purpose of prosecution (Article 7).
In United States law, common crimes committed against diplomats are
ordinarily left to prosecution by the states. Thus, federal law does not cover
the full range of offenses against internationally protected persons as to
which international law may require prosecution. But murder, kidnapping,
extortion, and assault are punishable under federal law. Under 18 U.S.C. §
1116, the federal homicide statutes are extended to include killing or attempts
to kill internationally protected persons; but any such murder, in the first
degree, is to be punished by life imprisonment, while attempted murder is
punishable by twenty years imprisonment. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1201, the
federal kidnapping statute includes cases in which the victim is an interna-
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tionally protected person; the offense is punishable "by imprisonment for
any term of years or for life"; an attempt by twenty years imprisonment.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 112(a), an assault or other violent attack on an inter-
nationally protected person or a violent attack on official premises, etc., is
punishable by three years imprisonment and a fine of $5,000; if a deadly
weapon is used, by ten years imprisonment and a fine of $10,000. Under 18
U.S.C. § 112(b), efforts to intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass are pun-
ishable by six months imprisonment and a fine of $500. Under 18 U.S.C. §
878, a threat to kill' or kidnap an internationally protected person is punish-
able by five years imprisonment and a fine of $5,000; a threatened assault
by three years imprisonment and a fine of $5,000; and extortion in connection
with any of these offenses by twenty years imprisonment and a fine of
$20,000. Federal jurisdiction is established with respect to all these offenses
"if the alleged offender is present within the United States, irrespective of
the place where the offense was committed or the nationality of the victim
or the alleged offender." 18 U.S.C. § 112(e); 18 U.S.C. § 878(d); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1116(c); 18 U.S.C. § 1201(e).
E. Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Vienna
& New York, March 3, 1980, I.A.E.A. Legal Series No. 12 (1982), 18 I.L.M.
1419 (1979), requires the parties to make the intentional commission of
various acts involving the unlawful acquisition of nuclear materials or threats
to use nuclear materials an offense under national law punishable "by
appropriate penalties" which take into account the "grave nature" of the
offense (Article 7). Each party is required "to establish its jurisdiction" over
such offenses committed on its territory, ships, or aircraft, or by its nationals,
and also in cases in which the offender is present in its territory and
extradition is refused (Article 8). These offenses are to be treated as extra-
ditable (Article 11) and, if extradition is refused, a party must submit the
case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution (Article 10).
The Convention is implemented in the United States by the Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Implementation Act of 1982,
Pub. L. 97-351, 96 Stat. .1663, which added 18 U.S.C. § 831 to federal law.
This section replicates the language of the Convention in defining various
prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials. These offenses are pun-
ishable by a fine of $250,000 and twenty years imprisonment; by imprison-
ment for any term of years or life if the offender knowingly causes death
or, in handling nuclear materials, recklessly causes death or serious bodily
injury. Conspiracy is punishable by a fine of $250,000 and ten years im-
prisonment or by twenty years imprisonment if a co-conspirator knowingly
caused death. These offenses are punishable if committed in the United
States or within "the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction" or "special
aircraft jurisdiction" of the United States, or by a United States national,
or with respect to nuclear material being shipped to or from the United
States, or by an offender who is found in the United States, "even if the
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conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United States," when
the offense involved nuclear material "in use, storage, or transport for
peaceful purposes" (18 U.S.C. § 831(c)).
III. INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC & RESOURCES
A. Slavery and Slave Trade
Under Article 5 of the General Act for the Repression of the African
Slave Trade, Brussels, July 2, 1890, 17 Martens Nouveau Recueil (2d) 345,
27 Stat. 886, T.S. No. 383, 1 Bevans 134: "The contracting powers pledge
themselves, unless this has already been provided for by laws in accordance
with the spirit of the present article, to enact or propose to their respective
legislative bodies, in the course of one year at the latest from the signing of
the present general act, a law rendering applicable, on the one hand, the
provisions of their penal laws concerning grave offenses against the person,
to the organizers and abettors of slave-hunting, to those guilty of mutilating
male adults and children, and to all persons taking part in the capture of
slaves by violence; and, on the other hand, the provisions relating to offenses
against individual liberty, to carriers and transporters of, and to dealers in,
slaves. The accessories and accomplices of the different categories of slave
captors and dealers above specified shall be punished with penalties propor-
tionate to those incurred by the principals...."
In the Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Geneva,
September 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, 46 Stat. 2183, T.S. No. 778, 2 Bevans
607, the parties undertake to "prevent and suppress the slave trade" and
"bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition
of slavery in all its forms" (Article 2); in Article 6: "Those of the High
Contracting Parties whose laws do not at present make adequate provision
for the punishment of infractions of laws and regulations enacted with a
view to giving effect to the purposes of the present Convention undertake
to adopt the necessary measures in order that severe penalties may be imposed
in respect of such infractions."
The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Geneva, September
7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3, 18 U.S.T. 3201, T.I.A.S. No. 6418, provides: "The
act of conveying or attempting to convey slaves from one country to another
by whatever means of transport, or of being accessory thereto, shall be a
criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties to this Convention and
persons convicted thereof shall be liable to very severe penalties" (Article
3(l)); "In a country where the abolition or abandonment of slavery, or of
the institutions and practices [similar to slavery such as debt bondage,
serfdom, or forced marriage] mentioned in article I of this Convention, is
not yet complete, the act of multilating, branding or otherwise marking a
slave or person of servile status in order to indicate his status, or as a
punishment, or for any other reason, or of being accessory thereto, shall be
a criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties to this Convention
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and persons convicted thereof shall be liable to punishment" (Article 5);
and "The act of enslaving another person or of inducing another person to
give himself or a person dependent upon him into slavery, or of attempting
these acts, or being accessory thereto, or being a party to a conspiracy to
accomplish any such acts, shall be a criminal offence under the laws of the
States Parties to this Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be
liable to punishment." (Article 6(1)).
Further, Article 13 of the Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, April
29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, provides:
"Every state shall adopt effective measures to prevent and punish the
transport of slaves in ships authorized to fly its flag, and to prevent the
unlawful use of its flag for this purpose ... "
In United States law, enslavement and enticement into slavery are punish-
able by a fine of $5,000 and five years imprisonment (18 U.S.C. §§ 1583-
1584). Fitting out a vessel in the United States for use in the slave trade is
punishable by a fine of $5,000 and seven years imprisonment (18 U.S.C. §
1582). United States nationals or residents who, as members of a ship's
company, actively engage in the slave trade are likewise punishable by a fine
of $5,000 and seven years imprisonment (18 U.S.C. § 1585); United States
nationals or residents who voluntarily serve on a vessel engaged in foreign
slave trade are punishable by a fine of $2,000 and two years imprisonment
(18 U.S.C. § 1586). The master of a vessel engaged in transporting a person
intended to be sold as a slave in the United States is punishable by a fine
of $10,000 and four years imprisonment (18 U.S.C. § 1587); the master of
a vessel engaged in transporting from the United States a person intended
to be sold as a slave is punishable by a fine of $5,000 and five years
imprisonment (18 U.S.C. § 1588).
B. Traffic in Persons
The Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, Paris,
May 18, 1904, 1 L.N.T.S. 83, 35 Stat. 1979, T.S. 496, 1 Bevans 424, is
mainly concerned with exchanging information and returning victims; it does
not speak to prosecution or punishment. The United States is not a party
to the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave
Traffic, Paris, May 4, 1910, 7 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 252, or the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and
Children, Geneva, September 30, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 415. But United States
law does make transportation for purposes of prostitution punishable by a
fine and five years imprisonment (18 U.S.C. § 2421); by ten years impris-
onment if a minor is transported (18 U.S.C. § 2423). Enticing or coercing
someone to travel for purposes of prostitution is likewise punishable by a
fine and five years imprisonment (18 U.S.C. § 2422). Under 18 U.S.C. §
2424, there is a duty to register with the Commissioner of Immigration any
alien kept in a house of prostitution within three years of entering the United
States from a country which is a party to the arrangement for the Suppression
of the White Slave Traffic, adopted July 25, 1902. (The 1902 arrangement
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was confirmed, word for word, in the formal Agreement of May 18, 1904.)
Failure to file the requisite statement is punishable by a fine of $2,000 and
two years imprisonment.
C. Narcotics
Under the Convention Relating to the Suppression of the Abuse of Opium
and Other Drugs, The Hague, January 23, 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187, 38 Stat.
1912, T.S. No. 612, 1 Bevans 855, the parties undertake to impose various
controls and prohibitions on the import, export, manufacture, distribution,
sale, and use of opium, morphine and cocaine. Criminal penalties may be
pre-supposed, but there is no precise stipulation requiring their imposition.
The parties are obliged, under Article 20, to "examine into the possibility
of enacting laws or regulations making the illegal possession of raw opium,
prepared opium, morphine, cocaine and their respective salts liable to pen-
alties, unless existing laws or regulations have already regulated the matter."
The Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distri-
bution of Narcotic Drugs, Geneva, July 13, 1931, 139 L.N.T.S. 301, 48
Stat. 1543, T.S. No. 863, 3 Bevans 1, requires the parties to "take all
necessary legislative or other measures in order to give effect within their
territories to the provisions of this Convention" (Article 15).
Likewise, the Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the
Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and
Use of Opium, New York, June 23, 1953, 456 U.N.T.S.3, 14 U.S.T. 10,
T.I.A.S. No. 5273, requires the parties to "adopt all legislative and admin-
istrative measures necessary for the purpose of making fully effective the
provisions of this Protocol" (Article 14). Again, while criminal penalties
may be presupposed, there is no precise stipulation to that effect.
On the other hand, under Article 36 of the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, New York, March 30, 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 204, 18 U.S.T. 1407,
T.I.A.S. No. 6298, as amended by Article 14 of the Protocol Amending the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Geneva, March 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T.
1439, T.I.A.S. No. 8118, provides: "l.(a) Subject to its constitutional lim-
itations, each Party shall "adopt such measures as will ensure that cultivation,
production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, offering, of-
fering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsover,
brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation and expor-
tation of drugs contrary to the provisions of this Convention shall be
punishable offences when committed intentionally, and that serious offences
shall be liable to adequate punishment particularly by imprisonment or other
penalties of deprivation of liberty. [But] (b) Notwithstanding the preceding
sub-paragraph, when abusers of drugs have committed such offences, the
Parties may provide, either as an alternative to conviction or punishment or
in addition to conviction or punishment, that such abusers shall undergo
measures of treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social rein-
tergration... ." Article 36 also provides for the punishment of accomplices,
attempt, and conspiracy, and for the extradition of offenders and for
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prosecution of serious offenses "by the Party in whose territory the offender
is found if extradition is not acceptable. . ....
Article 22 of the Convention on Psychtropic Substances, Vienna, February
21, 1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175, 32 U.S.T. 543, T.I.A.S. No. 9725, likewise
provides: "l.(a) Subject to its constitutional limitations, each Party shall
treat as a punishable offence, when committed intentionally, any action
contrary to a law or regulation adopted in pursuance of its obligations under
this Convention, and shall ensure that serious offences shall be liable to
adequate punishment, particularly by imprisonment or other penalty of
deprivation of liberty." Article 22 also authorizes treatment as an alternative
to the punishment of abusers of psychtropic substances, and provides for
the punishment of accomplices, attempt, and conspiracy, and for prosecution
of serious offenses "by the Party in whose territory the offender is found
if extradition is not acceptable. .. ."
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the Convention on Psy-
chotropic Substances are implemented in the United States by the provisions
of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, and the Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978,
Pub. L. 95-633, 92 Stat. 2768; these provisions are contained, for the most
part, in chapter 13 of Title 21 of the United States Code (21 U.S.C. §§ 801-
970).
D. Obscene Publications
The Agreement Relative to the Repression of the Circulation of Obscene
Publications, Paris, May 4, 1910, 37 Stat. 1511, T.S. No. 559, 1 Bevans
749, provides for exchanging information, but does not itself require pros-
ecution. The United States is not a party to the International Convention
for the Suppression of and Traffic in Obscene Publications, Geneva, Sep-
tember 12, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 213. But interstate or foreign traffic in
"obscene" publications is subject to prosecution under United States law,
and a first offense is generally punishable by a fine of $5,000 and five years
imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1465.
E. International Communications
1. Submarine Cables
Article 2 of the Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables, Paris,
March 14, 1884, 24 Stat. 989, T.S. No. 380, 1 Bevans 89, provides: "The
breaking or injury of a submarine cable, done willfully or through culpable
negligence, and resulting in the total or partial interruption or embarrassment
of telegraphic communication, shall be a punishable offense, but the pun-
ishment inflicted shall be no bar to a civil action for damages. This provision
shall not apply to ruptures or injuries when the parties guilty thereof have
become so simply with the legitimate object of saving their lives or their
vessels, after having taken all necessary precautions to avoid such ruptures
or injuries." Further, Articles 5 and 6 lay down rules for vessels in the
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vicinity of submarine cables; Article 9 provides that "Prosecutions on ac-
count of the infractions contemplated in articles 2, 5 and 6 of this convention,
shall be instituted by the State or in its name"; and Article 12 provides that
the parties will "take or propose to their respective legislative bodies the
measures necessary in order to secure the execution of this Convention, and
especially in order to cause the punishment, either by fine or imprisonment,
or both, of such persons as may violate the provisions of articles 2, 5 and
6."
A Declaration regarding the Convention, Paris, December 1, 1886, 25
Stat. 1424, T.S. No. 380-2, 1 Bevans 112, provides: "Certain doubts having
arisen as to the meaning of the word 'wilfully' inserted in Article 2 ... it
is understood that the imposition of penal responsibility, mentioned in the
said article, does not apply to cases of breaking or of injuries occasioned
accidentally or necessarily in repairing a cable, when all precautions have
been taken to avoid such breakings or damages."
Further, Article 27 of the Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, April
29, 1958, provides: "Every state shall take the necessary legislative measures
to provide that the breaking or injury by a ship flying its flag or by a person
subject to its jurisdiction of a submarine cable beneath the high seas done
wilfully or through culpable negligence, in such a manner as to be liable to
interrupt or obstruct telegraphic or telephonic communications, and similarly
the breaking or injury of a submarine pipeline or high-voltage power cable
shall be a punishable offence. This provision shall not apply to any break
or injury caused by persons who have acted merely with the legitimate object
of saving their lives or their ships, after having taken all necessary precautions
to avoid such break or injury."
These obligations are implemented in the United States by the Submarine
Cable Act of 1888, 25 Stat. 41, 47 U.S.C. §§ 21-33. Willfully breaking or
injuring a submarine cable is punishable by two years imprisonment and a
fine of $5,000 (47 U.S.C. § 21); doing so by culpable negligence, by three
months imprisonment and a fine of $500 (47 U.S.C. § 22); failure to follow
the rules for vessels in the vicinity of cables, by a months imprisonment and
a fine of $500 (47 U.S.C. § 24) or, in the case of the master of a fishing
vessel who does not keep nets at a proper distance, by ten days imprisonment
and a fine of $250 (47 U.S.C. § 25).
2. Postal Communications
Article 18 of the Universal Postal Union Convention, Vienna, July 4,
1891, 28 Stat. 1078, 1 Bevans 188, required adoption of necessary measures
for (1) punishing fraudulent use of counterfeit or used postage'stamps and
(2) for prohibiting and suppressing the manufacture, sale, and distribution
of counterfeit stamps. A similar article, as expanded over the years, has
appeared in each successive international postal convention. The latest version




Article 13 of the penultimate Universal Postal Convention, Rio de Janeiro,
October 26, 1979, 32 U.S.T. 4587, T.I.A.S. No. 9972, provides: "The
Governments of member countries undertake to adopt, or to propose to the
legislatures of their countries, the necessary measures: (a) for punishing the
counterfeiting of postage stamps, even if withdrawn from circulation, of
international reply coupons and of postal identity cards; (b) for punishing
the use or uttering: (i) of counterfeit postage stamps (even if withdrawn
from circulation) or used postage stamps, as well as of counterfeit or used
impressions of franking machines or printing presses; (ii) of counterfeit
international reply coupons; (iii) of counterfeit postal identity cards; (c) for
punishing the fraudulent use of genuine postal identity cards; (d) for pro-
hibiting and suppressing all fraudulent operations of manufacturing and
uttering adhesive stamps and stamped impressions in use in the postal service,
counterfeited or imitated in such a manner that they could be mistaken for
the adhesive stamps and stamped impressions issued by the postal adminis-
tration of a member country; (e) for preventing and, if necessary, for
punishing the insertion in postal items of narcotics and psychotropic subst-
ances, as well as explosive, flammable or other dangerous substances, where
their insertion has not been expressly authorized by the Convention and the
Agreements."
Under 18 U.S.C. § 502, the forging, using or uttering of counterfeit
foreign postage stamps is punishable by a fine of $500 and five years
imprisonment. The mailing of injurious articles is punishable, under 18
U.S.C. § 1716, by a fine of $1,000 and a years imprisonment; mailing with
intent to kill or injury, by a fine of $10,000 and twenty years imprisonment;
and, if death results, by life imprisonment or death.
While the United States is not a party to the International Convention for
the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, Geneva, April 20, 1929, 112
L.N.T.S. 371, a number of provisions of United States law also cover the
counterfeiting of foreign bonds, bank notes, and coins. See 18 U.S.C. §§
478-492.
F. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
I. Whaling
Article I of the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Geneva,
September 24, 1931, 155 L.N.T.S. 349, 49 Stat. 3079, T.S. No. 880, 3 Bevans
26, provides: "The High Contracting Parties agree to take, within the limits
of their respective jurisdictions, appropriate measures to ensure the appli-
cation of the provisions of the present Convention and the punishment of
infractions of the said provisions."
The Whaling Convention of 1931 has been effectively superceded by the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Washington, De,
cember 2, 1946, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. 1849, 4 Bevans
248. Article 9 provides: "Each Contracting Government shall take appro-
priate measures to ensure the application of the provisions of this Convention
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and the punishment of infractions against the said provisions in operations
carried out by persons or by vessels under its jurisdiction .... Prosecution
for infractions against or contraventions of this Convention shall be instituted
by the Government having jurisdiction over the offence."
The Convention is implemented in the United States by the Whaling
Convention Act of 1949, 16 U.S.C. §§ 916-916!. Violations of the Convention
are made unlawful (16 U.S.C. § 916c) and punishable by a fine of $10,000
and a years imprisonment (16 U.S.C. § 916]). Whaling is also covered by
the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407. A
violation of that act is subject to a civil penalty of $10,000 and knowing
violations are punishable by a fine of $20,000 and a years imprisonment (16
U.S.C. § 1375).
2. High Sea Fisheries
North Pacific Fisheries. Under Article 3 of the International Convention
for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, Tokyo, May 9,
1952, 205 U.N.T.S. 65, 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786, as amended by
the Protocol Amending the International Convention for the High Seas
Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, Tokyo, April 25, 1978, 30 U.S.T.
1095, T.I.A.S. No. 9242, one of the functions of the International North
Pacific Fisheries Commission established by the Convention is to "consider
and make proposals to the Contracting Parties concerning the enactment of
schedules of equivalent penalties for violations of this Convention which
occur outside the 200 nautical mile fishery zone of any Contracting Party. .. ."
Under Article 9, the parties agree that "(a) each Contracting Party shall
enforce the provisions of this Convention within its 200 nautical mile fishery
zone in accordance with its domestic law; (b) outside the 200 nautical mile
fishery zone of any Contracting Party, any Contracting Party may enforce
the provisions of this Convention. . . ." by searching and seizing vessels,
but only the authorities of the state to which the offender or fishing vessel
belongs "may try the offense and impose penalties therefor ... ." Further,
"[e]ach Contracting Party agrees, for the purpose of rendering effective the
provisions of this Convention, to enact and enforce necessary laws and
regulations, with appropriate penalties against violations thereof. .. "
The Convention on North Pacific Fisheries is implemented by legislation
appearing in 16 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1035. A violation of the Convention is
subject to a civil penalty of $25,000 and also constitutes an offense punishable
by a fine of $50,000 and imprisonment for six months, and by a fine of
$100,000 and imprisonment for ten years if a dangerous weapon is used
against an officer authorized to enforce the Convention (16 U.S.C. § 1030).
Salmon. Article 14(1) of the Convention for the Conservation of Salmon
in the North Atlantic, Reykjavik, March 2, 1982, T.I.A.S. No. 10789,
provides: "Each Party shall ensure that such action is taken, including the
imposition of adequate penalties for violations, as may be necessary to make
effective the provisions of this Convention and to implement regulatory
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measures which become binding on it ..... " through the procedures estab-
lished in the Convention.
The North Atlantic Salmon Convention is implemented in the United
States by provisions appearing in 16 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3608. Violations of the
Convention are subject to a civil penalty of $25,000 and punishable by a
fine of $50,000 and six months imprisonment (16 U.S.C. § 3606). Provisons
on Pacific Salmon Fishing in 16 U.S.C. §§ 3631-3644 implement a bilateral
treaty with Canada.
Tuna. Under Article 9 of the International Convention for the Conser-
vation of Atlantic Tunas, Rio de Janeiro, May 14, 1966, 673 U.N.T.S. 63,
20 U.S.T. 2887, T.I.A.S. No. 6767 (which has been amended by a Protocol
of July 10, 1984): "The Contracting Parties agree to take all action necessary
to ensure the enforcement of this Convention. . . ." The Convention is
implemented in the United States by the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of
1975, 16 U.S.C. §§ 971-971i. Violations of regulations adopted pursuant to
the convention are subject to civil penalties ranging from $25,000 to $100,000
(16 U.S.C. § 971e). The Tuna Conventions Act of 1950, 16 U.S.C. §§ 951-
961, contains provisions implementing bilateral tuna treaties with Mexico
and Costa Rica. The Eastern Pacific Tuna Licensing Act of 1984, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 972-972h contains provisions implementing the Eastern Pacific Ocean
Tuna Fishing Agreement, San Jose, Costa Rica, March 15, 1983, Senate
Treaty Doc. 98-3.
3. Wildlife
General Conventions. In the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife
Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, October 12, 1940, 161 U.N.T.S.
193, 56 Stat. 1354, T.S. No. 981, 3 Bevans 630, the parties agree to take
nature conservation measures, some of which involve prohibiting certain
kinds of conduct, such as hunting in national parks (Article 3) or the
importation of protected species without a certificate of lawful exportation
(Article 9). While these prohibitions presumably will be backed by criminal
sanctions, the treaty itself does not specifically provide for the criminalization
of such conduct.
Article 8(1) of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington, March 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S.
243, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, provides: "The Parties shall take
appropriate measures to enforce the provisions of the present Convention
and to prohibit trade in specimens in violation thereof. These shall include
measures: (a) to penalize trade in, or possession of, such specimens, or both;
and (b) to provide for the confiscation or return to the State of export of
such specimens."
The Trade in Endangered Species Convention is implemented in the United
States by the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543.
Violations are subject to civil penalties ranging from $500 to $10,000;
knowing violations are punishable by fines ranging from $10,000 to $20,000
and imprisonment ranging from six months to a year (16 U.S.C. § 1540).
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Migratory Birds. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712
implements bilateral treaties with Canada, Mexico, and Japan.
Polar Bears. Article 6 of the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar
Bears, Oslo, November 15, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 3918, T.I.A.S. No. 8409,
provides only: "Each Contracting Party shall enact and enforce such legis-
lation and other measures as may be necessary for the purpose of giving
effect to this Agreement. . . ." Implementing legislation is contained in effect
in the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§. 1361-1407.
Seals. The Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur
Seals, Washington, February 9, 1957, 314 U.N.T.S. 105, 8 U.S.T. 2283,
T.I.A.S. No. 3948, provides for the search and seizure by officials of any
party of vessels offending against the prohibition on pelagic sealing contained
in the Convention, although only authorities of the state to which a person
or vessel belongs has jurisdiction to try the case and to impose penalties
(Article 6). Under Article 10: "Each party agrees to enact and enforce such
legislation as may be necessary to guarantee the observance of this Conven-
tion and to make effective its provisions with appropriate penalties for
violation thereof."
The Convention is implemented in the United States by the Fur Seal Act
of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1175. Violations are subject to a civil penalty
of $10,000; knowing violations are punishable by a fine of $20,000 and one
years imprisonment (16 U.S.C. § 1174).
Antarctic Conservation. Article 2(2) of the Convention for the Conser-
vation of Antarctic Seals, London, June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441, T.I.A.S.
No. 8826, provides only: "Each Contracting Party shall adopt for its na-
tionals and for vessels under its flag such laws, regulations and other
measures, including a permit system as appropriate, as may be necessary to
implement this Convention."
The Antarctic Seals Convention is tied to the system established by the
Antarctic Treaty, Washington, December 1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, T.I.A.S.
No. 4780. Provisions implementing the Agreed Measures for the Conserva-
tion of Antarctic Fauna and Flora adopted by parties to the Antarctic Treaty
appear in the Antartic Conservation Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2412.
These make it unlawful, without a permit, to take any native mammal or
bird in Antarctica (16 U.S.C. § 2403(a)(1)). Violations of the act are subject
to a civil penalty of $5000 or of $10,000 if the violation was knowingly
committed (16 U.S.C. § 2407); a willful violation constitutes an offense
punishable by a fine of $10,000 and a years imprisonment (16 U.S.C. §
2408). The defendant may also be convicted for a violation of the Marine
Mammal Protection Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Migratory
Bird.Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. § 2408(c)).
Article 21 of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources, Canberra, May 20, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 10240, provides:
"I. Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate measures within its com-
petence to ensure compliance with the provisions of this Convention and
with conservation measures adopted by the Commission to which the Party
[Vol. 38:923
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
is bound in accordance with [the procedure established in the Convention.]
2. Each Contracting Party shall transmit to the Commission information on
measures taken pursuant to paragraph I above, including the imposition of
sanctions for any violation."
The Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention is implemented by the
Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention Act of 1984, 16 U.S.C. §§
2431-2444. Violations of the convention are unlawful (16 U.S.C. § 2435)
and subject to a civil penalty of $5,000 or $10,000 if the prohibted act was
knowingly committed (16 U.S.C. § 2437). Impeding enforcement of the act
is a criminal offense punishable by a fine of $50,000 and ten years impris-
onment.
4. Marine Pollution
Pollution from Ships. Article 3(3) of the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL), London, May 12,
1954, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, provided: "Any
contravention of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article [concerning discharge
of oil from ships] shall be an offence punishable under the laws of the
territory in which the ship is registered." Article 6 provided: "The penalties
which may be imposed in pursuance of Article III under the law of any of
the territories of a Contracting Government in respect of unlawful discharge
from a ship of oil or of an oily mixture into waters outside the territorial
waters of that territory shall not be less than the penalties which may be
imposed under the law of that territory in respect of the unlawful discharge
of oil or of an oily mixture from a ship into such territorial waters."
By Amendments of April 11, 1962, 600 U.N.T.S. 332, 17 U.S.T. 1524,
T.I.A.S. No. 6109, these two provisions were replaced by a new version of
Article 6, which reads: (1) Any contravention of Articles III and IX shall
be an offence punishable under the law of the relevant territory in respect
of the ship... (2) The penalties which may be imposed under the law of
any of the territories of a Contracting Government in respect of the unlawful
discharge from a ship of oil or oily mixture outside the territorial sea of
that territory shall be adequate in severity to discourage any such unlawful
discharge and shall not be less than the penalties which may be imposed
under the law of that territory in respect of the same infringements within
the territorial sea ......
OILPOL 1954 has been superceded as between parties to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), London,
November 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973). MARPOL is binding on the
United States through its ratification of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
London, February 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546 (1978).
Article 4 of MARPOL provides: "(1) Any violation of the requirements
of the present Convention shall be prohibited and sanctions shall be estab-
lished therefor under the law of the Administration of the ship concerned
wherever the violation occurs. If the Administration is informed of such
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violation and is satisfied that sufficient evidence is available to enable
proceedings to be brought in respect of the alleged violation, it shall cause
such proceedings to be taken as soon as possible, in accordance with its law.
(2) Any violation of the requirements of the present Convention within the
jurisdiction of any Party to the Convention shall be prohibited and sanctions
shall be established therefor under the law of the Party. Whenever such a
violation occurs, that Party shall either (a) cause proceedings to be taken in
accordance with its law; or (b) furnish to the Administration of the ship
such information and evidence as may be in its possession that a violation
has occurred. (3) Where information or evidence with respect to any violation
of the present Convention by a ship is furnished to the Administration of
that ship, the Administration shall promptly inform the Party which has
furnished the information or evidence, and the [Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative] Organization, of the action taken. (4) The penalties specified
under the law of a Party pursuant to the present Article shall be adequate
in severity to discourage violations of the present Convention and shall be
equally severe irrespective of where the violations occur."
MARPOL is implemented in the United States by the Act to Prevent
Pollution from Ships (1980), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1911. Violations are subject
to a civil penalty of $25,000; knowing violations are punishable by a fine of
$50,000 and imprisonment for five years (33 U.S.C. § 1908).
Ocean Dumping. Article 7 of the Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Washington, London,
Mexico City & Moscow, December 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No.
8165, provides that each party (1) "shall apply the measures required to
implement the present Convention" and (2) "shall take in its territory
appropriate measures to prevent and punish conduct in contravention of the
provisions of this Convention."
Implementing legislation is contained in the Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445. Violations are subject
to a civil penalty of $50,000; knowing violations are punishable by a fine of
$50,000 and a years imprisonment (33 U.S.C. § 1415).
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